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THE ETHICAL LIMITS OF DISCREDITING 
THE TRUTHFUL WITNESS:  
HOW MODERN ETHICS RULES FAIL TO 
PREVENT TRUTHFUL WITNESSES FROM 
BEING DISCREDITED THROUGH 
UNETHICAL MEANS 
TODD A. BERGER* 
Whether the criminal defense attorney may ethically discredit the 
truthful witness on cross-examination and later during closing argument 
has long been an area of controversy in legal ethics.  The vast majority of 
scholarly discussion on this important ethical dilemma has examined it in 
the abstract, focusing on the defense attorney’s dual roles in a criminal 
justice system that is dedicated to searching for the truth while 
simultaneously requiring zealous advocacy even for the guiltiest of 
defendants.  Unlike these previous works, this particular Article explores 
this dilemma from the perspective of the techniques that criminal defense 
attorney’s use on cross-examination and closing argument to cast doubt 
on the testimony of a credible witness.  It shows that, while it is ethically 
permissible to discredit the truthful witness, it is not uncommon for 
criminal defense attorneys to do so through unethical means.  Further, 
absent voluntary compliance, current ethics rules cannot adequately 
prevent this type of professional misbehavior.  Thus, a change in the 
culture of criminal defense lawyering is necessary to ensure that criminal 
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defense attorneys recognize the value of increased compliance with the 
ethical dictates that govern the practice of law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether it is ethical to present a “false defense”1 by discrediting a 
truthful witness on cross-examination and later during closing argument 
has been an area of great focus in modern legal ethics.2  This Article 
explores the most common forms of cross-examination and closing 
argument that criminal defense attorneys use to accomplish this task.  
This work posits that, pursuant to current ethics guidelines, there are 
both ethical and unethical techniques that can be used to advance a false 
defense by discrediting the truthful witness. 
While it is ethically permissible to discredit the truthful witness,3 
current ethics rules place reasonable constraints on the types of cross-
examinations and closing arguments that can be used to make the 
truthful witness appear unworthy of belief.4  Despite this fact, it is a 
commonplace occurrence in America’s criminal courtrooms for truthful 
witnesses to be discredited not through ethical means, but instead 
 
1.  A “false defense” is defined as a trial theory in which defense counsel attempts “to 
convince the judge or jury that facts established by the state and known to the attorney to be 
true are not true, or that facts known by the attorney to be false are true.”  Harry I. Subin, 
The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission”: Reflections on the “Right” to Present a False Case, 
1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 126 (1987). 
2.  Eleanor W. Myers & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Discrediting the Truthful Witness: 
Demonstrating the Reality of Adversary Advocacy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1055, 1055 (2000) 
(This question is the subject of fascinating commentary and thoughtful debate in professional 
literature”).  “Whether it is ethically permissible to suggest that a truthful witness is lying 
during cross-examination has been famously characterized as one of the ‘three hardest 
questions’” in terms of the ethical dilemmas faced in the practice of law.  Id. (quoting Monroe 
H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest 
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1966)). 
3.  See Subin, supra note 1, at 126. 
4.  Id. 
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through the use of unethical techniques that largely ignore the 
reasonable limits placed on the types of cross-examinations and closing 
arguments that can be used to make the true look false.5  The reason for 
this is simple: the use of unethical forms of cross-examination and 
closing argument are the most effective from a trial advocacy 
perspective. 
Further, in noting the ethical boundaries of the common techniques 
that are used to discredit truthful witnesses, it becomes clear that, absent 
voluntary compliance, current ethics rules are largely unable to prevent 
criminal defense attorneys from adopting these unethical forms of trial 
advocacy.6  It is also unlikely that ethics rules will be amended to ensure 
that those who adopt unethical forms of cross-examination and closing 
argument will be revealed.7 
As a result, the culture of criminal defense lawyering must change to 
ensure that criminal defense attorneys recognize that ethics rules that 
allow for truthful witnesses to be discredited, while placing reasonable 
limits on the types of cross-examination and closing arguments that are 
used to this effect, represent a fair and commendable balance between 
zealous advocacy of even the guiltiest defendants and that the 
corresponding search for the truth that is at the center of a criminal 
trial.8  This change in the culture of criminal defense lawyering and a 
recognition of the value of these rules is an essential component of 
ensuring voluntary compliance with these largely unenforceable, ethical 
dictates in the context of making the true look false and the false look 
true. 
This work leaves for another day a discussion concerning how this 
particular change in the culture of criminal defense lawyering can be 
brought about.  Instead, this Article is limited to identifying the problem 
at hand, i.e., the frequency with which unethical techniques are used to 
discredit honest witnesses when advancing a false theory of defense and 
 
5.  See infra Part III.B, IV. 
6.  Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to 
Our Students, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753, 795 (2004). 
7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
8.  This Article addresses these competing values in greater detail in infra Part III.C.2.  
However, the lawyer’s dilemma in serving these competing ideals is perhaps best summed up 
by Professor Peter J. Henning who observes, “Lawyers must deal with a conundrum because 
they are required to act as officers of the court—presumably working to advance the truth—
while providing loyal representation to clients who may have little to gain from its 
ascertainment, particularly in criminal cases.”  Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty 
in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 211 (2006). 
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the inability of contemporary ethics rules to police this type of 
misbehavior.  In this sense, this work is intended as an important first 
step in bringing about the more ethical practice of law in this unique 
context. 
This work proceeds in three parts.  Part II explains why criminal 
defense attorneys discredit truthful witnesses and provides an overview 
of the current scholarly literature addressing this topic.  Part III 
demonstrates an applied approach to understanding the ethical limits of 
discrediting the truthful witness and provides a normative critique of 
current ethics rules that regulate this type of attorney conduct.  Part IV 
explains why trial attorneys frequently choose unethical techniques to 
advance a false theory of defense and explores the difficulty that exists 
in curbing this type of unethical behavior. 
II. THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF DISCREDITING THE TRUTHFUL 
WITNESS 
A. Why Lawyers Discredit Truthful Witnesses 
In a criminal case, choosing a theory of defense is generally 
considered a matter of trial tactics and strategy.9  It has become an 
accepted part of trial practice to view the selection of a particular theory 
of defense as the primary responsibility of defense counsel, subject to 
consultation with his10 client.11 
Sometimes the theory of defense may be based on the client’s 
exculpatory account of “what really happened.”12  However, sometimes 
a client admits to his attorney that he is guilty of the crime, and the 
 
9.  Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law and 
Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1660 (2000) 
(“Initially, the decision regarding whether to explore an avenue of defense and how to 
present it is largely a matter of tactics or strategy.” (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1999)). 
10.  A fact pattern is used throughout this Article that is partially based on an actual 
criminal trial.  In that trial the defendant was a male.  Therefore, the pronoun “he” is used 
throughout this work for the purposes of literary consistency only. 
11.  This traditional view was perhaps best articulated by the Supreme Court of 
Colorado in Steward v. People, 498 P.2d 933, 934 (Colo. 1972) (holding that it was the defense 
lawyer who made the decisions in his role as “captain of the ship” as to what evidence to offer 
and what strategy to employ in the presentation of the defense).  For a more detailed 
discussion concerning this area of trial practice, see generally Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Joshua 
Allen, WHO DECIDES: The Allocation of Powers Between the Lawyer and the Client in a 
Criminal Case?, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Oct. 2002, at 28. 
12.  See infra note 53. 
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defendant wants to challenge the state’s case without testifying, despite 
the fact that the state’s evidence is legally sufficient to establish each 
element of the crime.13  To that end, one legal expert posed the 
following question, “What should a criminal defense lawyer do when the 
lawyer is certain that the client is factually guilty (usually because the 
client has confessed to the lawyer), but the client nevertheless insists on 
a strong defense?  This situation may be the defense lawyer’s worst 
nightmare.”14 
When the state’s evidence is legally sufficient to prove each element 
of the crime, often times the criminal defense attorney must challenge 
the weight (said another way—the quality) of the prosecution’s evidence 
by discrediting the truthful witness and in the process presenting a false 
defense.15  Put simply, when faced with such a predicament, the criminal 
defense attorney may have no other choice but to pursue this type of 
defense. 
B. An Overview of Current Scholarly Literature 
As noted previously, whether it is ethically permissible to discredit 
the truthful witness on cross-examination and closing argument has 
been a topic that has long fascinated legal scholars.16  However, rather 
than discuss the specific ethical limitations placed on the types of cross-
examinations and closing arguments that are used to discredit honest 
witnesses, the general tenure of the existing scholarly debate has largely 
focused on more abstract-oriented discussions concerning whether 
society’s best interests are advanced when the criminal defense attorney 
attempts to distort the truth.17 
 
13.  See Subin, supra note 1, at 146. 
14.  Michael Asimow & Richard Weisberg, When the Lawyer Knows the Client Is Guilty: 
Client Confessions in Legal Ethics, Popular Culture, and Literature, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 229, 229 (2009). 
15.  See Todd A. Berger, A Trial Attorney’s Dilemma: How Storytelling as a Trial 
Strategy Can Impact a Criminal Defendant’s Successful Appellate Review, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 
297, 302–06 (2012).  When challenging the weight of the evidence, the defendant has 
conceded that the evidence is sufficient in the abstract to make out each element of the crime 
charged.  Id. 304–05.  In this sense, the defendant has acknowledged the state has presented a 
sufficient quantity of evidence to justify a conviction.  Id.  A review based upon a sufficiency-
of-the-evidence claim examines the quantity of evidence presented by the prosecution and 
determines whether the prosecution has presented enough evidence to make out each 
element of the crime or crimes charged.  Id. at 302.  However, a challenge to the weight of the 
prosecution’s evidence is not a challenge to its quantity, but rather its quality.  Id. at 304–05. 
16.  See Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1055; see also Freedman, supra note 2. 
17.  See John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to 
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In this regard, some scholars have posited that defense counsel 
should “do anything within the bounds of the law” in representing his 
client, regardless of the client’s guilt or innocence.18  In embracing this 
type of advocacy, Professor John B. Mitchell argues that the goal of the 
criminal defense attorney is not to seek the truth but to ensure that the 
criminal defendant is not convicted unless the state can present proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.19   Therefore, according to Mitchell, it is 
ethically permissible for a criminal defense attorney to present the jury 
with alternative possibilities that counsel knows to be false, as doing so 
has the net effect of protecting the factually innocent and acting as a 
check on the government’s power.20  Mitchell’s argument has been 
referred to as a “systemic justification” for presenting a false defense.21   
Other scholars contend that the criminal defense attorney should 
advance a false defense and attempt to make the truthful witness look 
untruthful based on what has been termed “the ‘client-centered’ 
justification for zealous advocacy.”22  These scholars argue that this form 
of zealous advocacy is necessary to advance client dignity and 
autonomy.23 
 
Professor Subin’s Position on Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission,” 1 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 339, 339 (1987) (asserting that whether an attorney should discredit a truthful witness 
is “a difficult issue which touches upon the very nature of our criminal justice system, the role 
of the attorney in that system, the relationship of the individual to the state, and the 
Constitution”).  
18.  Suni, supra note 9, at 1649 (observing that some theorists argue that “defense 
counsel can, and perhaps must, do anything within the bounds of the law to represent their 
clients, regardless of innocence or guilt and regardless of the effect on third persons or 
truth”). 
19.  See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 340–41. 
20.  Id. at 342–44.  Mitchell posits that “the criminal justice system protects the 
individual from the police power of the executive branch” and that requiring the government 
to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an essential component of protecting 
individual rights.  Id. at 342.  In this sense, Mitchell maintains that defense counsel can put 
forth what he terms a “pure reasonable doubt defense” in which counsel presents the jury 
with alternative possibilities that counsel knows are false, without asserting the truth of those 
alternatives.  Id. at 343–44. 
21.  See Suni, supra note 9, at 1651. 
22.  See id. 
23.  See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 13, 26–27 
(1990).  Freedman’s basic premise is that the American adversarial legal system is rooted in 
the Bill of Rights and exists principally to affirm the human dignity of each individual.  Id.  
Freedman believes that it is necessary for the criminal defense attorney to advance a false 
defense because doing so preserves the sanctity of lawyer-client confidentiality—the lawyer 
only knows the “truth” through client confidences—which safeguards individual autonomy 
and dignity.  Id. at 65–86. 
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Other thinkers posit that client-centered advocacy requires vigorous 
discrediting of truthful witnesses because the principal obligation the 
lawyer owes to his client is one of fidelity and loyalty.24  In reaching this 
conclusion, some of these thinkers draw heavily on religious texts, which 
they believe provide spiritual support for their position.25 
However, not all scholars have so readily embraced the notion that 
the defense attorney should advance a false defense by discrediting the 
truthful witness.  Perhaps most prominently, Professor Harry I. Subin 
argues for a more limited role when defense counsel knows the 
defendant is guilty, which is motivated in large part by the defense 
attorney’s dual obligations as an advocate and an officer of the court.26  
Subin concedes that, because the defendant has a constitutional right to 
force the government to prove each element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it corresponds that it is likewise ethically permissible 
to discredit the truthful witness in order to challenge the weight of the 
government’s evidence.27 
 
24.  See Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER 
L. REV. 443, 519–29 (1999).  In a provocative article, Professors Smith and Montross posit 
that the principal duty owed to the client is the duty of fidelity and loyalty, which is derived 
from biblical teachings contained in “The Prophets and The Writings.”  Id. at 518–19.  The 
duty of fidelity in turn requires that the criminal defense attorney rigorously cross-examine a 
truthful or sympathetic witness.  Id. at 528–29. 
25.  Id. at 518–19. 
26.  See Subin, supra note 1, at 128.  Subin proposed that criminal defense attorneys 
should be prohibited from asserting defenses that they know to be false.  Id. (“It is true that in 
our system the prosecution has the burden of proving guilt, and the defense the 
corresponding right to remain completely passive in the presentation of facts to the jury.  It is 
true that the defense attorney has the right, and the obligation, to challenge the government’s 
proof to assure its accuracy.  The question is whether it should also be the ‘duty’ of the ‘most 
honorable’ defense attorney to take affirmative steps to subvert the government’s case when 
he or she knows it is accurate.  I shall argue that the attorney can perform his or her duty fully 
even if not permitted to act in this way, and that if stricter limits on truth subversion were 
instituted, the rights of persons accused of crimes generally would be enhanced.”). 
27.  See Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present 
a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689, 689–90 (1988).  Subin found support for this 
position in ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, which holds that a criminal defense 
attorney is entitled to “put the prosecution to its proof even if there is no nonfrivolous basis 
for the defense.”  Id. at 696 n.34 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 Model 
Code Comparison (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)).  “[A]ccording to the drafters [of the rule], it 
reflects, ‘the constitutional principle that the state must prove every element of the 
crime . . . .’”  Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 
Proposed Final Draft 1981)).  For a more detailed exploration of the constitutional right to 
discredit the truthful witness and present a false defense, see Part III.C.2. 
 2015] DISCREDITING THE TRUTHFUL WITNESS 291 
Nevertheless, to Subin, criminal defense lawyers have a primary 
obligation to the truth, and tactics that distort or mislead the jury are 
inconsistent with this obligation.28  Initially, Subin argued that when 
defense counsel knows the client is guilty, in such instances, he should 
be limited to a monitoring role to ensure that a conviction is based on an 
adequate amount of competent and admissible evidence.29  Subin later 
modified his position, based in part on the defendant’s constitutional 
right to challenge the state’s case, and proposed that defense lawyers 
could argue carefully worded alternative inferences or explanations that 
the attorney knows are not true for the purpose of assisting the fact 
finder in measuring the weight of the evidence.30  However, in Subin’s 
view, the jury should be given an instruction that it is permissible for the 
defense to offer alternative versions of the facts, even if it has no good 
faith basis for believing the truth of its position.31  Moreover, Subin 
rejects the assertion of the systemic justifications noted above, i.e., that 
truth subversion in an individual case is a necessary component of 
preventing governmental overreaching in the large scheme of the 
criminal justice system.32   
Subin’s view has been referred to as a form of “weak 
adversarial[ism.]”33  Proponents of this type of lawyering suggest that it 
advances societies interests because 
 
28.  See Subin, supra note 1, at 125 n.5, 149 (arguing that “a fundamental goal” of the 
criminal justice system “is determining the truth” and that when the truth is subverted, the 
justice system is properly considered a “victim”). 
29.  Id. at 146.  Subin argues: 
Unless we abandon completely the notion that verdicts should be based upon the 
truth, we must accept the fact that there may simply be no version of the facts 
favorable to the defense worthy of assertion in a court.  In such cases, the role of the 
defense attorney should be limited to assuring that the state adduces sufficient 
legally competent evidence to sustain its burden of proof. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
30.  Subin, supra note 27, at 689–90.  Subin modified his position partly because he had 
come to believe his earlier monitor role formulation was unworkable.  Id.  However, in 
modifying his position, he also noted that defense counsel could suggest alternative 
explanations to test the weight of the government’s evidence based on the constitutional 
principle that the defendant had the right to force the government to prove each element of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 690. 
31.  Id. at 698. 
32.  Subin, supra note 1, at 148–49. 
33.  Asimow & Weisberg, supra note 14, at 245–46.  In addition to Subin, other legal 
theorists have also embraced a weak adversarial position.  See David Luban, Partisanship, 
Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 
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[i]t is only when the judge and jury know the truth that society 
wins.  Each time the lawyer uses talents and skills to pollute the 
courtroom with a lie, either explicit or implicit, the lawyer has 
intentionally diminished the chances that individual justice will 
be done.  Thus society loses.34 
As detailed above, much of the discussion relating to the ethics of 
arguing a false defense by discrediting the truthful witness does not 
focus on the trial advocacy techniques used to accomplish this task but 
instead addresses broader policy or philosophically oriented objectives.  
Indeed, thousands of pages have been written with regard to these types 
of arguments and the positions of Professors Subin and Mitchell have 
been prominently featured in the leading legal ethics casebooks.35  
However, despite the policy-oriented focus of these discussions, other 
legal commenters have rightly noted that, in the context of discrediting 
the truthful witness, criminal defense attorneys “do routinely use an 
arsenal of tricks to subvert the truth”36 and that, for this reason, a 
significant problem in attorney ethics relates more directly to the 
various techniques that defense lawyers consistently use to conceal and 
distort the truth.37 
When addressing the actual techniques of truth subversion, not only 
have most scholars simply glossed over their application to existing 
ethics rules38 but, to the extent they have addressed them at all, there 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1018–43 (1990) (favoring a position of weak adversarialism in cross-
examining truthful witnesses in rape cases); Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True Look 
False and the False Look True, 41 SW. L.J. 1135, 1143 (1988) (arguing that cross-examination 
should be barred when the defense lawyer knows that the witness’s testimony regarding their 
self-perceived level of certainty is correct); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal 
Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1710–12 (1993) (arguing that criminal defense lawyers 
should not engage in any form of deception). 
34.  Teresa Stanton Collett, Understanding Freedman’s Ethics, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 455, 
464–65 (1991). 
35.  See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND 
ETHICS 419–24 (5th ed. 1998); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
LAWYERING 437–38 (3d ed. 1999); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 
279–305 (2d ed. 1995); RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW 256–73 (1995). 
36.  Daniel Walfish, Making Lawyers Responsible for the Truth: The Influence of Marvin 
Frankel’s Proposal for Reforming the Adversary System, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 613, 619 
(2005). 
37.  See id. 
38.  Id. at 636–38. 
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appears to be little consistency in their conclusions.39  Professor Subin is 
of the view that “[t]o the extent that these techniques of legal truth-
subversion have been addressed at all, most authorities have approved 
them.”40  However, Professor Subin’s conclusion is drawn in a cursory 
manner, and he spends very little time engaged in any type of in-depth 
analysis of actual trial techniques or ethics guidelines.41  Importantly, as 
this Article thoroughly details below,42 Professor Subin’s contention is 
simply not accurate.  Further, Professor Mitchell, in glossing over the 
trial techniques used to argue a false defense, appears to acknowledge 
the existence of some ethical limitations on how false defenses are 
presented.43  In this sense, he suggests, without any discussion of existing 
ethical rules, that it is permissible to argue a false defense so long as the 
jury is not told a falsehood (“I will not assert that facts known by me to 
be true are false or those known to be false are true.”).44  Other 
commenters have even less thoroughly addressed how current ethics 
rules limit the means by which truthful witnesses may be discredited by 
suggesting that, while it is ethically permissible to argue false inferences 
from true facts to test the prosecution’s case, it is only “more 
controversial” to make an explicit representation to the jury that 
defense counsel knows is false.45 
 
39.  Id. 
40.  See Subin, supra note 1, at 127 (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.6 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1980 & Supp. 1986)). 
41.  Id. at 152–53. 
42.  See infra Part III.B. 
43.  Mitchell, supra note 17, at 344. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1059–65.  In addition to the above, it also worth 
noting that other scholars have addressed the issue of discrediting the truthful witness but in a 
manner that is less focused on the specific types of cross-examination and closing arguments 
that are used to argue a false defense.  In exploring the ethical limitations of a false-defense 
theory from the perspective of current ethical guidelines, Professor Suni focuses on the ethics 
of blaming innocent third parties for the commission of a crime.  Suni, supra note 9.  
However, Professor Suni’s analysis of the actual closing argument presented to the jury does 
not indicate exactly how the false theory of defense was communicated.  Id.  Professor Steven 
J. Johansen has explored the ethical limits of the false defense from the perspective of applied 
legal storytelling in his essay Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?: An Essay on the Ethical 
Limits of Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 63 (2010).  
Professor Johansen argues that legal storytelling poses ethical challenges to lawyers in that 
stories may be persuasive that are not always true.  Id. at 64.  However, Professor Johansen 
does not explore the exact techniques that criminal defense attorneys use to advance false 
defenses and notes that “stories lawyers tell must reveal their clients’ good faith beliefs.”  Id. 
at 65.  In this regard, this Article explores the ethical limits of how criminal defense attorneys 
advance false defenses that are expressly premised on the absence of a good faith belief.  See 
 
 294 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 99:283 
This Article addresses this gap in scholarly literature by exploring 
the limits that current ethics rules place on the actual techniques that 
criminal defense attorney’s use on cross-examination and closing 
argument to discredit the truthful witness.  What follows is a 
demonstration of these techniques,46 an exploration of their ethical 
parameters,47 and an examination of current ethics rules from a 
normative point of view.48 
III. AN APPLIED APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE ETHICAL 
STATUS OF DISCREDITING TRUTHFUL WITNESSES 
A. Methods for Discrediting Truthful Witnesses 
1. Hypothetical Case: Commonwealth v. Cassidy 
a. The Facts 
To demonstrate the techniques used to discredit truthful witnesses 
and the ethical challenges associated with each technique, consider the 
following hypothetical case, which will be referred to as Commonwealth 
v. Cassidy.49 
The below facts were testified to on direct examination and are 
substantially the same as the facts recounted in the police report 
provided to defense counsel prior to trial: 
At 7:00 p.m. on February 14, 2000, Philadelphia police 
received a radio call that a man wearing a red T-shirt and blue 
sweatpants was in possession of a handgun. 
At 7:03 p.m., Police Officer Frank Drebin arrived at the 
scene.  Officer Drebin testified that he has worked in the area for 
 
id. 
46.  See infra Part III.A. 
47.  See infra Part III.B. 
48.  See infra Part III.C. 
49.  This example has been in large part adopted from an actual trial and represents the 
actual defense theory in the case.  I should stress that I have no idea whether the theory that 
was ultimately advanced was known by defense attorney to be false.  Also, I am uncertain as 
to how the actual defense theory was advanced, i.e., through the use of the ethical or 
unethical means.  I was not involved in the preparation in this case and participated in no 
way.  I was merely an observer of sorts.  I have changed the names of the parties involved and 
added a few rhetorical flourishes for the reader’s enjoyment.  The liberties I have taken with 
certain facts in no way change the conceptual framework in which this defense theory was 
advanced. 
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many years and knows it to be an area with a high rate of violent 
crime.  Illegal firearm possession is a common offense in the area 
as well. 
When Officer Drebin arrived on the scene, he noticed the 
man, later identified as Mr. Quinton Cassidy, standing on the 
sidewalk.  Mr. Cassidy immediately turned away from the officer 
and began to walk quickly in the opposite direction.  Mr. Cassidy 
was wearing black sweatpants and had on a maroon colored T-
shirt.  In the back of the sweatpants the officer could see the 
outline of a handgun.  The officer was forty-five feet away from 
the defendant.  The officer drew his own weapon out of a 
concern for officer safety.  The officer called for Mr. Cassidy to 
stop.  At this point, Mr. Cassidy, with his back to the officer, 
reached his hand around his back and grabbed the handle of the 
gun and began to turn toward the officer.  The officer, fearing 
that Mr. Cassidy was about to fire the weapon at him, fired his 
own weapon three times.  Each bullet struck Mr. Cassidy in his 
leg.  Mr. Cassidy was then arrested. 
A firearm was recovered from the right hand of Mr. Cassidy.  
Mr. Cassidy’s fingerprints were on the firearm.  The gun weighed 
five pounds.  Mr. Cassidy was arrested and charged with 
Unlawful Possession of a Firearm Without a License.50 
Officer Drebin was cleared by internal affairs, which 
determined the shooting was justified. 
No other witnesses, except Officer Drebin, were called at 
trial because they could not be located by either side. 
The pre-trial discovery process reveals that Officer Drebin has a 
checkered past, most of which involves the questionable use of force.  
The most significant incident involved the shooting of five unarmed men 
in a park.  Officer Drebin maintains that the shooting was justified 
because he saw several men in togas stabbing another man in view of 
100 people.  It was later revealed that Officer Drebin merely witnessed a 
 
50.  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6106(a)(1) (2008).  “Firearms not to be carried without a 
license” reads in relevant part, 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle 
or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his 
place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license 
under this chapter commits a felony of the third degree. 
Id. 
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“Shakespeare in the Park” production of Julius Caesar.51  Officer 
Drebin is on employment-related probation as a result of the above 
incident.  He has been notified that if Internal Affairs finds one more 
violation of police department policy, he will be dismissed. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel interviews Mr. Cassidy.  The police 
report is read to him, and he is asked to tell you his version of events.  
After reading the police report to Mr. Cassidy, he states, “That is what 
happened.”  He never deviates from his admission.  He refuses to 
entertain a plea bargain, insists on going to trial, and does not wish to 
testify.52 
b. Criminal Defendants Do Admit Their Guilt  
A popular myth has developed, no doubt fed in large part by movies, 
television shows, and literature, that criminal defense attorneys never 
ask clients what actually happened. 53  Instead, they say things such as, 
“Now I don’t want to know if you are guilty,” or “Before you begin, let 
me first tell you about the law.”54  Some lawyers do in fact adopt this 
approach.55  The logic of this approach seems to rest on the notion that, 
if a client admits his guilt, his lawyer cannot later allow him to change 
 
51.  This particular scenario was inspired by the movie the Naked Gun.  
Mayor: Drebin, I don’t want any more trouble like you had last year on the 
Southside.  Understand?  That’s my policy. 
Frank: Yes.  Well, when I see 5 weirdos dressed in togas stabbing a guy in the 
middle of the park in full view of 100 people, I shoot the bastards.  That’s my policy. 
Mayor: That was a Shakespeare in the Park production of Julius Caesar, you moron!  
You killed 5 actors!  Good ones! 
THE NAKED GUN: FROM THE FILES OF POLICE SQUAD! (Paramount Pictures 1988). 
52.  The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the 
defendant cannot be made to testify at trial if he wishes not to.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in relevant part, “No 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  Id. 
53.  Perhaps the most famous example of this can be seen in the movie Anatomy of a 
Murder.  Before asking his client, played by Ben Gazzara, to explain what occurred, the 
attorney, played by Jimmy Stewart, explains what the legal defenses to murder are in the state 
of Michigan and how those defenses can be advanced based on the proof that the police have 
accumulated.  ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959); see also ROBERT 
TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 37 (1958); Samuel Dash, Ethical Defense of Accused 
Persons, U.S. AIR FORCE JAG BULL., Jan. 1962, at 12, 13 (commenting on the “the best 
selling novel, ‘Anatomy of a Murder,’” and its effect on public perception of how lawyers 
conduct client interviews). 
54.  See Dash, supra note 53, at 13. 
55.  Id. 
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his story and testify to his innocence at trial, as that would be perjury.56  
Furthermore, if a client is made aware of the state’s case prior to telling 
his lawyer what happened and is informed of possible legal justifications 
that might excuse his conduct, the client can then tailor, or invent, an 
exculpatory story that conforms to the state’s evidence and testify 
accordingly.57 
By in large, however, this approach is the stuff of popular culture 
more than the actual practice of law because defense attorneys 
understand the danger of this approach quite well.58  When the lawyer 
only asks for the client’s version of the facts after the client has been 
told how the state’s facts relate to the law, or the lawyer tells his client 
he does not want to know if the client is actually guilty, the “client may 
be tempted to make up a story that is not totally consistent with what 
occurred.”59  As a result, the client’s story may represent an exaggerated 
version of events that the jury sees as lying; may prevent defense 
counsel from learning about facts that would be important to address at 
trial (because witnesses in criminal cases do in fact testify to facts that 
are not always reflected in pre-trial discovery and the prosecution can 
call rebuttal witnesses); and may put defense counsel at a disadvantage 
in determining how hard he can press during his examination of the 
state’s witnesses.60 
Therefore, it is not surprising to hear Samuel Dash, the famed Chief 
Counsel for the Senate Watergate Committee, observe, “Any good 
defense lawyer wants to know from the start all the true facts known by 
the client concerning the charge against him without embellishment or 
distortion.”61  Certainly, if the client admits his guilt, in most 
circumstances (the exception being a version of diminished capacity or 
 
56.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.2(d), 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2014). 
57.  Whether or not this approach is itself ethical is a matter about which legal 
commenters disagree.  Professor Samuel Dash has referred to this approach as coaching the 
client and has opined that “the coaching of a client before he tells his story ethically 
improper.”  Dash, supra note 53, at 13.  However, Professor Randolph Braccialarghe 
maintains that this type of client interview is ethically permissible because the lawyer is not 
“actively introducing false evidence or untruth into the system.”  Randolph Braccialarghe, 
Why Were Perry Mason’s Clients Always Innocent? The Criminal Lawyer’s Moral Dilemma—
The Criminal Defendant Who Tells His Lawyer He Is Guilty, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 65, 72–73 
(2004). 
58.  See Dash, supra note 53, at 13. 
59.  See Braccialarghe, supra note 57, at 72–73. 
60.  See id. at 72–73; see also Dash, supra note 53, at 13. 
61.  See Dash, supra note 53, at 13. 
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self-defense), the client’s attorney will not be able to put the client on 
the stand to tell a different story without committing perjury.62  
Nevertheless, legal commentators have observed that it is advantageous 
to permit a client to speak freely with his attorney, even to the point of 
the client admitting his guilt.63 
It is certainly the case that, even if defense counsel makes clear to his 
client that he wants to know all of the bad facts (even if that means the 
client admits guilt), guilty clients nevertheless insist they are innocent.64  
However, unlike the fictional television shows in which most clients are 
actually innocent, the real-life experiences of lawyers do in fact involve 
representing admittedly guilty clients who insist on going to trial.65  It is 
for this reason that Dash further observes that, when the attorney knows 
all of the true facts concerning the charge against the defendant, the 
attorney is then “able to make the soundest and most intelligent 
judgment concerning fact investigation, legal research and strategy.”66 
 
62.  See Braccialarghe, supra note 57, at 72. 
63.  See id. at 73 (“[T]here appears to be a certain advantage to permitting a client to 
speak freely with his attorney to the point of even admitting that he has committed the act he 
is accused of committing.”). 
64.  See Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About 
Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (commenting on his experience at the Public 
Defender Service for the District of Columbia and observing that in in his experience “those 
charged with very serious offenses do not readily admit guilt to their attorney” and that, in his 
opinion, often times “clients believe that defense attorneys will give better representation to 
clients whom they believe are innocent”). 
65.  See Braccialarghe, supra note 57, at 69.  Professor Braccialarghe uses the fictional 
Perry Mason television show as an example.  Id. at 70.  He laments that while Perry Mason’s 
clients were always innocent, in the real life practice of law that is certainly not always the 
case.  Id.  Professor Braccialarghe comments, 
Hence, if popular culture were to more accurately portray to the public the criminal 
defense attorney’s function, one would have to rewrite those Perry Mason (and Ben 
Mattlock) television episodes to have Perry’s secretary, Della Street, or his 
investigator, Paul Drake, congratulate Perry on having successfully convinced a jury 
to acquit a guilty client.  And then, at the celebratory dinner when Hamilton Burger 
comes over to Perry’s table, Hamilton could say something to the effect of, 
“Celebrate all you want now Perry, but we will pick him up the next time he kills 
somebody, and he probably won’t have enough money to hire you a second time.”  
It is unlikely that a television series that routinely shows lawyers using their skills to 
allow guilty clients to go free would have much success with the public.  Nor would 
these shows do much for lawyers’ self-esteem or their reputations with the public. 
Id. 
66.  Dash, supra note 12, at 13.  To that end, Professor Randolph Braccialarghe has 
made the following observation: 
On several occasions, when speaking at continuing legal education seminars 
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c. It Is Possible to Know That a Defense Theory Is Actually False  
Further, just as some believe that criminal defense attorneys do not 
know if their client is guilty, there is a myth that there is really no such 
thing as a false defense.67  Therefore, no further discussion concerning 
the ethical limitations of how a false defense is advanced by discrediting 
a witness is necessary.  These commentators reason that there is no such 
thing as a false defense or any attendant ethical prohibitions involved in 
its use (with certain obvious exceptions such as fabricating evidence) 
because an attorney can never really “know” that a particular theory of 
defense is actually false.68 
Much of this argument is premised on what some scholars have 
called the “indeterminacy of truth.”69  For example, perhaps the 
defendant never committed the crime but tells his lawyer that he is 
guilty to protect the actual guilty party.  Perhaps the defendant is afraid 
that the guilty party will harm him or his family if the defendant refuses 
to “take the rap.”  Or perhaps the defendant is not guilty but may be 
potentially embarrassed to admit the circumstances surrounding his 
arrest, even if they are exculpatory in nature.  In this regard, whatever 
theory defense counsel comes up with may actually be true because the 
defense attorney does not actually know it is false.  However, current 
ethical guidelines and decisional law have rejected this position.70 
In terms of suggesting that an attorney can never actually know what 
really happened, assuming the defense attorney was not present at the 
scene of the crime, this is literally true.  However, the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct Model Rule 1.0(f), as well as Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers section 120, have denoted that, while 
knowledge is to be considered “actual knowledge” of a fact in question, 
 
attended by criminal defense lawyers, I have asked the lawyers present for a show of 
hands of those who have succeeded in getting jury acquittals in the last year or so.  I 
then asked those individuals how they had gotten those acquittals.  The vast 
majority have said that they found it more successful to have their clients tell them 
everything, even if that meant that the client could not later take the stand.  Client 
candor increases the attorney’s ability to meet and overcome the state’s evidence. 
Braccialarghe, supra note 57, at 73 n.30. 
67.  See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 343. 
68.  See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140. 
69.  Id. at 1140–41; see also Freedman, supra note 2, at 1472. 
70.  See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176 (1986); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
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“[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”71  By 
making clear that knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, the 
rules ultimately demonstrate that current ethics guidelines have rejected 
the assertion that a lawyer must literally know something is false in 
order to constitute knowledge of a falsehood.  Professor Steven Lubet 
has noted, “As an ethical matter . . . we should be more ready to assume 
that our client’s words—both helpful and damaging—are likely to be 
true.  It is after all, the client’s case.”72 
Further, in the seminal case of Nix v. Whiteside,73 in which defense 
counsel threatened to withdraw from his client’s case if his client insisted 
on testifying falsely, the United States Supreme Court unanimously 
accepted the trial court’s conclusion that Whiteside’s lawyer knew that 
Whiteside intended to commit perjury.74  Therefore, insisting that a 
 
71.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (“A lawyer’s knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.”); Erin K. Jaskot & 
Christopher J. Mulligan, Witness Testimony and the Knowledge Requirement: An Atypical 
Approach to Defining Knowledge and Its Effect on the Lawyer as an Officer of the Court, 17 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 845–46 (2004) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014)).  This is not to suggest that it is always easy to discern when 
knowledge may be inferred based on circumstantial evidence.  Beyond the most obvious 
circumstances, courts have articulated different standards for what constitutes knowledge.  
Jaskot & Mulligan, supra, at 847.  These definitions have ranged from circumstantial 
evidence, a good faith belief, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to a “firm factual basis.”  Id. 
(citing Brian Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan, Note, The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing 
Prospective Client Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 935, 943–44 (2002)). 
72.  STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 5 (4th ed. 
2009). 
73.  475 U.S. at 172. 
74.  Id. at 161, 163.  Immediately before his trial for murder, the defendant Whiteside 
told his court-appointed attorney Robinson that he intended to testify that when he stabbed 
the deceased, he thought the deceased was pulling out a pistol and that he had seen 
something metallic in the deceased’s hand.  Id. at 161.  His proposed testimony about 
“something metallic” was inconsistent with his prior statements to his attorney as well as the 
other evidence.  Id. at 160–62.  Robinson told Whiteside that such testimony would be 
perjury.  Id. at 161.  When Whiteside insisted that he intended to testify he had seen 
something metallic, Robinson responded that if Whiteside insisted on committing perjury, he 
would advise the court that Whiteside was committing perjury, seek to withdraw, and attempt 
to impeach Whiteside’s false testimony.  Id.  When Whiteside testified, he explained why he 
thought the deceased had a gun but admitted that he had not actually seen one and did not 
claim that he had seen something metallic.  Id. at 161–62.  The jury returned a verdict of 
second-degree murder.  Id. at 162.  In his attack on his conviction, Whiteside argued that he 
had been deprived of a fair trial by Robinson’s threats, which prevented him from testifying 
that he had seen a gun or something metallic.  Id.  Whiteside argued that his trial attorney’s 
threats to inform the court of his perjured testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 162–63.  The Supreme Court analyzed this claim under 
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lawyer can never actually know what is true and what is false runs 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in Nix v. Whiteside in which 
“the Supreme Court established clear boundaries on when knowledge 
would be presumed.”75 
Therefore, both relevant ethics guidelines and the Court’s holding in 
Nix v. Whiteside demonstrate that existing legal authority recognizes 
that defense counsel can in fact know that a particular defense theory is 
false and that a particular witness is telling the truth.76  As will be seen 
shortly, however, knowledge that a defense is false in no way prevents a 
defense attorney from discrediting a truthful witness.77  Instead, this 
knowledge only impacts the means by which a truthful witness may be 
discredited.78 
d. The False Theory of Defense in Commonwealth v. Cassidy  
Based on the hypothetical facts offered above, the defense attorney 
has invented the following trial theory knowing full well that it is not 
true because the defendant admitted he committed the crime. 
Defense counsel will implore the jury to believe that the police 
officer is incompetent and quick to pull the trigger.  In this telling, the 
officer overreacted (per his tendency) and shot an unarmed civilian, 
planted a gun on the defendant, and then lied about the defendant 
possessing the gun.  The defense attorney will suggest such by 
insinuating that parts of the police officer’s story are incredible (i.e., the 
ability to see the gun at a distance of forty-five feet at night in poor 
lighting conditions and that the five-pound gun could actually be held in 
the elastic waistband of the defendant’s sweatpants).  The defense 
attorney will argue that the police officer’s version of events is 
untruthful because the police officer has a motive to fabricate and plant 
a gun on the person he shot.  The officer must provide his own 
 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its prejudice and performance standards.  
Nix, 475 U.S. at 175 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694–95).  The Court held that Whiteside’s 
contentions did not satisfy Strickland’s prejudice standard and that Robinson’s performance 
had satisfied Strickland’s performance standard in that it had been well within the range of 
effective representation “in accord with professional standards.”  Id. at 175–76. 
75.  See Suni, supra note 9, at 1654 n.43 (citing Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140). 
76.  See Nix, 475 U.S. at 176; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2014). 
77.  See infra Part III.B. 
78.  See infra Part III.B. 
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exculpatory version of events to justify the shooting and to avoid losing 
his job or criminal prosecution. 
To advance this particular trial theory, the defense attorney must 
first cross-examine the truthful prosecution witness with the goal of 
discrediting his version of events.  Later the defense attorney will 
present a closing argument in which he argues that the police officer’s 
version of events is not to be believed based on the facts established on 
cross-examination. 
2. Cross-Examination Strategies 
a. Cross-Examination Based on Eliciting True Facts 
The hallmark of this type of cross-examination is that defense 
counsel will only ask questions on cross-examination designed to illicit 
truthful responses from the prosecution witness.  In some respects, this 
type of cross-examination may appear underwhelming and the theory of 
defense may not be readily apparent.  However, during closing 
argument, defense counsel can later use these truthful answers to string 
together a series of inferences that collectively weaken the state’s case.79  
In the context of the Cassidy case, this type of cross-examination would 
look something like this: 
Q: Officer, when you arrived at the scene you parked your car 
about forty-five feet away from my client? 
A: Correct.  
Q: It was dark out, wasn’t it?  
A: It was.  
Q: Wasn’t the closest street light forty-five feet away from where 
the shooting took place? 
A: That’s about right.  
A: You were not using your flashlight?  
A: I never had my flashlight out.  
Q: My client was wearing sweatpants, correct?  
 
79.  An inference is defined as “[a] conclusion reached by considering other facts and 
deducing a logical consequence from them” or “[t]he process by which such a conclusion is 
reached; the process of thought by which one moves from evidence to proof.”  Inference, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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A: Yes. 
Q: They have an elastic band?  
A: Yes, I believe so.  
Q:  This gun weighed five pounds?  
A: I believe that is correct based on what it says in the report.  
Q: It’s your testimony that the gun weighing five pounds was 
being held up by the elastic waistband of my client’s pants.  
A: That is what I saw.  
Q: Officer Drebin, isn’t it true that you previously shot numerous 
individuals in the park and only got a warning for it?   
A: Yes, but that was justified. I thought they were stabbing that 
man to death and Internal Affairs understood.  They only gave 
me a warning.   
Q: You’re currently on probation with internal affairs, aren’t 
you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: They have told you that one more unjustified shooting and 
you’ll be fired, correct?  
A: Yes. 
Q: In fact, if Internal Affairs doesn’t clear the shooting, you can 
be charged criminally?   
A: I suppose that’s right.  
b. The False-Story Cross-Examination 
Unlike the “true answers” cross-examination detailed above, this 
particular type of cross-examination operates in exactly the opposite 
manner.  In other words, it is premised on defense counsel asking the 
witness a series of questions in which defense counsel knows that the 
underlying factual predicate on which the question is based is false.80  
When defense counsel asks the witness a question, he expects the 
witness to deny the question’s implication by answering in the 
negative.81  As a result, the questions asked on cross-examination 
 
80.  See Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 738–39 (1997). 
81.  See Subin, supra note 1, at 126. 
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amount to nothing more than innuendo the defense attorney knows to 
be false.  However, unlike a cross-examination based on true facts, this 
type of cross-examination is generally not underwhelming.  The “false-
story” cross-examination allows the defense attorney to present the full 
theory of defense as an alternative story to the one being offered by the 
prosecution through the questions asked on cross-examination.82  This 
type of cross-examination would look something like this:  
Q: Officer Drebin, isn’t it true that you never saw my client reach 
for the gun because it was too dark?  
A: I did see him reach for the gun.   
Q: Really, weren’t you too quick to pull the trigger just like you 
were in the park incident?  
A: Please, that was totally justified.  
Q: In fact, isn’t it true that my client never had a gun at all?  
A: That is definitely not true. 
Q: Listen—let’s be honest.  You knew you couldn’t tell Internal 
Affairs the truth that you shot an unarmed man in the leg 
because you would lose your job, isn’t that correct?  
A: No, he was armed.  I told Internal Affairs the truth.  
Q: Weren’t you afraid that if Mr. Cassidy died you would be 
charged with murder? 
A: He tried to shoot me.  
Q: You knew you had to plant a gun on him to justify the 
shooting, didn’t you?  
A: I don’t know how many times I have to tell you this; he 
reached for his gun. 
Q: After you shot him, you put the gun in his hand, didn’t you?  
A: You’re a liar.  I never did that.  
The above cross-examination is referred to as the false-story cross-
examination because its design closely adheres to the definition of a 
story.83  Through the attorney’s questions, the defense theory of 
innocence is presented as (1) a purposefully ordered sequence of events, 
 
82.  See id. at 126, 133–35. 
83.  See Posner, supra note 80, at 738–39. 
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designed to achieve a specific goal,84 while (2) explaining these events by 
focusing on characters, their goals, and their struggles to achieve their 
goals.85  Thus, the above false-story cross-examination presents an 
alternative story to the jury (that the gun was planted on Quinton 
Cassidy), and this alternative version of events is explored from the 
perspective of Officer Drebin’s penchant for incompetence and his 
motive to fabricate. 
3. Closing Arguments 
a. The False-Implication Closing Argument  
This type of closing argument has two salient features.  First, the 
defense attorney never explicitly says anything to the jury that he knows 
to be untrue.86  Importantly, this includes not telling the jury that the 
defendant is innocent but merely that the defendant is not guilty.87   
 
84.  Id. 
85.  Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of 
Story, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 9 (2010).  Professor Kenneth D. Chestek 
has noted, if all that is provided is a purposely ordered sequence of events, this is not so much 
a story as an “information-based narrative[].”  Id.  As a result, a true story needs “sufficient 
context to allow the reader to fully see and understand why the participants in the story 
behaved as they did, and what they were trying to accomplish in the face of various 
obstacles.”  Id.  Professor Ruth Anne Robbins has further posited that 
[w]ithin the legal framework, a story has a few key elements: character, point of 
view, conflict, resolution, organization, and description.  The story must contain a 
cast of characters, and the author must choose to tell the story from someone’s point 
of view.  Each character has needs and goals.  The author controls how much the 
audience knows about those needs and goals. 
Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using 
the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 
772 (2006) (footnote omitted). 
86.  See Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1065; Subin, supra note 1, at 126–27, 134–35. 
87.  Being not guilty and being innocent are not the same thing.  A finding of not guilty 
is a legal construct that relates only to forcing the state to prove each element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, asserting that the state cannot prove each element of a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt is not the same as a specific declaration that the defendant 
never committed the crime in the first place.  See Freedman, supra note 2, at 1471 (“The plea 
of not guilty does not necessarily mean ‘not guilty in fact,’ for the defendant may mean ‘not 
legally guilty.”).  Even the accused who knows that he committed the crime is entitled to put 
the government to its proof.  Carl M. Selinger, Dramatizing on Film the Uneasy Role of the 
American Criminal Defense Lawyer: True Believer, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 223, 227–28 
(1997) (“In this country, there is no question that criminal defense lawyers may ethically 
plead admittedly guilty clients ‘not guilty,’ and argue that their guilt has not been proved.”); 
see also Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 270 (2002) (“The criminal 
justice system is not designed to grant moral absolution or to declare innocence.  While 
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Second, the jury is presented with an alternative explanation that 
exculpates the defendant without the trial attorney affirmatively telling 
the jury something he knows to be false.88  As a result, the theory of 
defense is never explicitly told to the jury.  Instead, the jury is only 
asked to draw false inferences from true facts and to evaluate the 
evidence through the prism of reasonable doubt.89  As a result, the 
theory of defense is only implied—it is never actually stated. 
In the Cassidy case, this type of closing argument might go as 
follows:  
My client is not guilty of the crime with which he has been 
charged.  I ask you ladies and gentleman of the jury to consider 
the following: The government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that my client possessed a firearm.  To do so, you must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the police officer saw the 
firearm on a dark street with poor lighting conditions.  You 
should also ask yourself if my client was able to hold a five-
pound handgun in the elastic of his waistband.   
When deciding if they have proven their case beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must ask yourself if you believe the 
evidence the government has presented without stopping, 
hesitating, or seriously considering that evidence before reaching 
a verdict of guilty.90  In deciding whether to believe the police 
officer, you must also consider that this officer had a lot to lose if 
he was found to have shot an unarmed citizen.  He is on 
probation for doing the same thing.  He could lose his job.  He 
could even be charged with murder or attempted murder.  
Officer Drebin has a much better chance of not being fired or 
charged with a crime if the person he shot just happened to have 
had a gun rather than if the officer had once again shot an 
unarmed civilian. 
 
innocence cannot necessarily be inferred from an acquittal, a conviction implies the certainty 
of guilt.” (footnote omitted)). 
88.  See Subin, supra note 27, at 690. 
89.  Mitchell, supra note 17, at 357. 
90.  See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 720 A.2d 473, 481–82 (Pa. 1998) (holding that a jury 
instruction which defines reasonable doubt as the type of doubt that causes a reasonable 
person to “stop, hesitate and seriously consider” whether he would do a certain thing before 
finally acting adequately conveys the legal principle that is reasonable doubt). 
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b. The Evidence-Reflects Closing Argument  
The hallmark of the “evidence-reflects” closing argument91 is that 
the lawyer makes sure to use a qualifying phrase when asking the jury to 
expressly draw an inference that the lawyer knows to be untrue.92  This 
type of closing argument can more directly state the theory of defense 
simply by prefacing those statements with the appropriate qualifying 
language, as opposed to relying exclusively on implication.93  By using 
these types of qualifying statements the lawyer is not expressly vouching 
for an alternative version of events to the one presented by the state, but 
merely stating that the evidence technically reflects such a possibility. 
However, when making this type of closing argument, the lawyer 
need not preface every statement by qualifying it first with “the 
evidence reflects.”  The lawyer can, of course, still continue to make the 
types of statements that are used in the false implication closing 
argument that are technically true and only imply the theory of defense.  
In this regard, the evidence-reflects type of argument is really a 
modified version of the false-implication closing argument. 
In the Cassidy case, this type of closing argument might look 
something like this:  
The evidence reflects that my client is innocent.  The 
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that my 
client possessed a firearm.  The evidence demonstrates that the 
police officer could not see the firearm on a dark street with poor 
lighting conditions.  The evidence also shows that my client could 
not hold that five-pound gun in the elastic waistband of his 
sweatpants. 
You have heard evidence relating to how much the police 
officer has to lose if he was found to have shot an unarmed 
citizen.  He is on probation for doing the same thing.  He could 
lose his job.  He could even be charged with murder or 
attempted murder.  Officer Drebin has a much better chance of 
not being fired or charged with a crime if the person he shot just 
happened to have had a gun rather than if the officer had once 
 
91.  While this Article refers to this as the evidence-reflects closing argument, defense 
counsel could just as easily use interchangeable phrases such as “the evidence shows” or the 
“evidence demonstrates,” all of which connote the same point. 
92.  See JACOB A. STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENTS: THE ART AND THE LAW § 1:17 
(2015). 
93.  See id. 
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again shot an unarmed civilian.  Officer Drebin has a motive to 
lie about what happened that day.  The evidence reflects that 
Officer Drebin planted that gun on my client.  
c. The False-Story Closing Argument  
The “false-story” closing argument differs significantly from the 
false-implication and evidence-reflects types of closing arguments.  
While the defense attorney who uses the false-story closing argument 
also asks the jury to draw false inferences from true facts, in doing so, 
the attorney phrases that argument through a series of explicit 
statements that he knows to be false, without the use of any qualifying 
language.94  This includes affirmatively stating that the defendant is 
actually innocent of the crime charged.95   
All of the above types of closing arguments are designed to present 
an alternative version of what really happened.96  However, because the 
false-story closing argument is not wed to true statements, the theory is 
told to the jury in the story form described previously, as opposed to 
suggesting to the jury in a series of carefully worded and qualified 
statements asking the jury to draw certain inferences.97  It is for this 
reason that this technique is referred to as the false-story closing 
argument. 
In the Commonwealth v. Cassidy, this type of closing argument looks 
like this:  
Now, ladies and gentleman of the jury, my client is innocent.  
Officer Drebin has testified about his version of what happened.  
Officer Drebin is lying.  Now let me tell you what really went 
down out there.  Officer Drebin can’t be believed when he says 
he saw my client with a gun.  In those dark lighting conditions, he 
couldn’t see anything.  There is no way my client could carry a 
five-pound gun in the elastic of his sweatpants without it falling 
out.  That version of events would be laughable if it wasn’t for 
the fact that charging an innocent man with a crime is no 
laughing matter.   
Here’s what really happened.  The police officer responded 
to the scene and saw my client minding his own business.  My 
 
94.  See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 357. 
95.  See Braccialarghe, supra note 57. 
96.  See Subin, supra note 27, at 689–90. 
97.  See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 357. 
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client turned to walk away from the officer, but the officer had a 
quick trigger finger, just like he has had before.  Officer Drebin 
got scared out there on the street.  When my client went to turn 
and respond to the officer, the officer couldn’t see what was in 
my client’s hands because of how dark it was.  Drebin lost his 
cool.  He shot first and decided he would deal with the 
consequences later.   
After he realized my client never had a gun in the first place, 
Police Officer Drebin planted the gun on my client.  Officer 
Drebin knew he was on thin ice.  He put the gun in my client’s 
hand.  That’s why the gun has my client’s fingerprints on it.  
Anything to avoid losing his job or even being charged with 
murder.   
B. The Ethical Status of Methods for Discrediting Truthful Witnesses  
1. Governing Ethical Rules and Standards  
The ethical limitations of the above types of cross-examinations and 
closing arguments can be examined from the perspective of the three 
primary sources of ethical guidance for American lawyers.  These are 
the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct,98 the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,99 and 
the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and 
Defense Function.100  These guidelines fall into two general categories: 
rules and standards.101  The primary difference between the two is that 
rules are binding and violating an ethical rule may lead to disciplinary 
action,102 while ethical standards are non-binding resolutions that are 
primarily intended to act as a best-practices model.103   
 
98.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
99.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
100.  STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). 
101.  Daniel S. Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical 
Standards that Govern Summations in Criminal Trials, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 916 
(2011). 
102.  Cecelia Klingele, Confidentiality and Disclosure: What the New ABA Criminal 
Justice Standards (Don’t) Say About the Duties of Defense Counsel, 38 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 983, 984–85 (2011) (noting that the most influential source of guidance for attorney 
conduct “will be the rules of professional conduct that govern the behavior of lawyers within 
a specified jurisdiction: Because breach may result in professional sanction, lawyers are likely 
to pay close attention to the content of these rules”).  Enforcement of formal ethics rules is 
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The most important set of ethics rules that regulate attorney conduct 
are the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Model Rules 
have been adopted, at least in part, as the formal ethics rules by every 
state in the country, with the exception of California.104  A violation of 
these rules can result in a state authorized sanction.105  While non-
binding, the ABA Standards and the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers have also proven to be important, additional 
sources of guidance for administrative bodies and organizations tasked 
with issues of attorney discipline and ethics compliance.106   
 
largely done through formal disciplinary proceedings before a state bar or high court.  
MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 42–43 (8th ed. 2007); see 
also Medwed, supra note 101, at 916. 
103.  Medwed, supra note 101, at 916. 
104.  “The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the ABA House 
of Delegates in 1983. . . . Before the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA model was the 
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.  Preceding the Model Code was the 1908 
Canons of Professional Ethics.”  ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct.html [http://perma.cc/9ZJA-R4CZ] (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) 
(providing a history of the evolution of ABA ethics codes).  Oversight of attorney conduct in 
federal courts is not based on a uniform set of rules.  Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, 
Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 76 (2009).  Instead, 
different federal courts regulate attorney conduct by picking and choosing between local state 
rules, their own standards, and ABA models.  Id. 
105.  See Klingele, supra note 102, at 984–85. 
106.  The ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice have no legal authority unless adopted 
by a court or legislature.  Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice 
Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1113 (2011); see 
also Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of 
Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2008, at 10, 11.  Despite this fact, while generally non-binding, 
the Standards for Criminal Justice function as a potentially influential source of guidance in 
terms of defining the ethical limitations of attorney conduct.  Klingele, supra note 102, at 985.  
While also non-binding, another important source of ethical guidance comes from the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.  The primary 
goal of the Restatement is not to supplant ABA ethics guidelines, but to complement them.  
The Restatement, therefore, is influenced not only by ABA ethics rules but also by decisional 
law and other statutory text.  Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers: A View from the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 712 (1998) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS at xxxvi (AM. LAW INST., 
Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996)).  In this sense, the Restatement reflects the drafter’s 
objective “to clarify the law and to provide a text that courts and other legal bodies deciding 
contested cases can employ confidently as a general statement of relevant legal doctrine.”  
Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 541 
(1997) (quoting Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 211 (1987)). 
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2. Applying Ethical Rules to Lawyer’s Techniques  
a. The True-Facts Cross-Examination Is Ethical  
In terms of cross-examination, perhaps the most important guiding 
principle emerging from each of the above three sets of ethical 
regulations is that, prior to questioning a witness, a good faith basis must 
exist to support the questions’ underlying implication.107  In terms of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the good faith basis requirement 
on cross-examination is found in Model Rule 3.4(e), providing that a 
lawyer may not “allude to any matter . . . that will not be supported by 
admissible evidence.”108  While Model Rule 3.4(e) does not use the 
actual words “good faith basis,” or specifically reference cross-
examination, commentators and courts have generally viewed Model 
Rule 3.4(e) as requiring a good faith basis for the questions asked on 
cross-examination.109  While Model Rule 3.4(e) is silent with respect to 
 
107.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 4-7.6(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). 
108.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); see also 
Steven Lubet, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance: Truth or Justice in the Old West, 48 UCLA 
L. REV. 353, 365 (2000) (“This principle, also referred to as the ‘good faith basis’ rule, 
provides that lawyers must build their cases on a foundation of truth.  They are free to use 
their questions to intimate all manner of guilt-negating possibilities, but only on the basis of 
truthful answers.”). 
While legal commentators and courts agree that the good faith basis on cross-
examination rule is encompassed in Model Rule 3.4(e), not all commentators agree.  Daniel 
D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and Modern Adversary Trial, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10 
(2006).  For example, one commentator says:  
Rule 3.4(e) appears principally concerned with “allusions” and statements by 
counsel during opening and closing arguments, and not the evidentiary phase of 
trial.  The opening clause’s use of the future tense—“allude to any matter that the 
lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by 
admissible evidence”—seems oriented toward counsel’s opening statements.  And 
the remainder of 3.4(e) is expressly limited to statements by counsel, which 
generally occur during the opening or closing argument. 
Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004)).  In light 
of Professor Blinka’s contention, this Article will also apply Model Rule 3.4(e) to its analysis 
of the ethical limits of closing arguments. 
109.  E.g., Lubet, supra note 108, at 365; see also In re Zawada, 92 P.3d 862, 867 (Ariz. 
2004) (finding impermissible the prosecutor’s questions implying a mental health expert had 
fabricated his diagnosis of the defendant in the absence of a good faith basis under several of 
Arizona’s ethics rules, including its equivalent of 3.4(e)); State v. Tosh, 91 P.3d 1204, 1209, 
1215 (Kan. 2004) (holding that it was a violation of Rule 3.4(e) of the Kansas Rules of 
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what level of proof constitutes “admissible evidence,” decisional law has 
provided that a “reasonable suspicion” that the facts implied by the 
question are true will suffice to satisfy an attorney’s ethical 
obligations.110  Importantly, confidential statements made by a client 
during the attorney-client interview satisfy the good faith basis test.111   
Restatement section 107(2) appears to be the Restatement’s version 
of Model Rule 3.4(e) and uses virtually identical language.112  The 
 
Professional Conduct for the prosecution to ask the defendant if he ever intended to plead 
guilty without a factual basis for the question). 
The good faith basis rule, in addition to being an actual ethics rule, also exists as a rule of 
evidence.  Where evidentiary principles and legal ethics intersect, one scholar has noted that 
it may not always be clear which body of law preceded the other and, “[a]lthough it is difficult 
to tell which came first, certain well-established evidentiary principles seem to stem directly 
from professional standards.”  Fred C. Zacharias, Are Evidence-Related Ethics Provisions 
“Law”?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1317–18 (2007). 
The evidentiary version of the good faith basis rule does not appear expressly in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  Arguably, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and its prohibition on 
evidence that would represent an unfair prejudice encompass the good faith basis rule.  FED. 
R. EVID. 403.  However, the rule clearly pre-dates the formal adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in 1975 and existed as a common law rule of evidence.  See Michelson v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 469, 470–74 (1948); United States v. Wells, 525 F.2d 974, 977 (5th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. West, 460 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582, 
588 (2d Cir. 1963); Roberson v. United States, 237 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1956); see also 
United States v. Fowler, 465 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Pugh, 436 F.2d 
222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  All of these cases pre-date the formal adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and all hold that the prosecution must have some good faith factual basis 
for the incidents inquired about on cross-examination when impeaching a defense character 
witness.  Both state and federal courts apply the good faith basis requirement.  See King v. 
State, 89 So. 3d 209, 224 (Fla. 2012); Chavies v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 313, 322 (Ky. 
2012); Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 317 (Miss. 2000); State v. Dawson, 268 S.E.2d 572, 576 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Wynter, 770 N.E.2d 542, 546 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) 
(citing United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hall, 
989 F.2d 711, 716–17 (4th Cir. 1993)) (noting not only that Massachusetts requires a good 
faith basis for questions asked on cross-examination, but that “Federal cases are in accord”).  
Additionally, courts have held that the prohibition against asking questions on cross-
examination without a good faith basis does not violate the criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation.  See United States v. Beck, 625 F.3d 410, 417–20 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
110.  See State v. Marble, 901 P.2d 521, 524–25 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); see also United 
States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
111.  J. Alexander Tanford, The Ethics of Evidence, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 487, 501 
(2002). 
112.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“In representing a client in a matter before a tribunal, a lawyer may not, in the 
presence of the trier of fact allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is 
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.”). 
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commentary to this particular rule makes clear that, like its Model Rule 
counterpart, it also contains its own good faith requirement.113   
For its part, the ABA Standards explicitly prohibit the asking of a 
question on cross-examination without a good faith basis.114  ABA 
Standard 4-7.6(d) states, “Defense counsel should not ask a question 
which implies the existence of a factual predicate for which a good faith 
belief is lacking.”115  The comment to ABA Standard 4-7.6(d) defines 
what it means by a good faith basis by providing that a good faith basis 
does not exist when a cross-examiner asks a question “that would be 
advantageous to have answered in the negative” when the cross-
examiner has no evidence to support the question’s implication116 or 
innuendo.117 
The underlying rationale for the good faith basis requirement stems 
from the concern that “[f]alse insinuations in a question, even if 
followed by an indignant denial from the witness, undoubtedly leave a 
trace of prejudice in the jury’s mind.”118  As one court has sternly noted, 
“If this rule is breached, the violator should be severely censured.  Such 
practice is impermissible and should not be tolerated.”119   
A basic application of the above ethical standards indicates that the 
cross-examination, which is designed only to elicit true facts,120 is 
ethically permissible, even though it will eventually be used to cast 
 
113.  Under a heading entitled “‘Backdoor’ methods of proof of an inadmissible matter,” 
the commentary to this Restatement section notes disapprovingly that “[t]rial maneuvers can 
be calculated to suggest to the fact-finder (especially a jury) legally irrelevant and otherwise 
inadmissible evidence or considerations.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  For the purposes of the instant 
discussion, the most relevant of the commentary’s examples provides that “[a] lawyer may not 
offer evidence on the representation that a proper foundation will be laid for its admission 
when the lawyer has no reasonable basis for believing that . . . such a foundation can be 
provided.”  Id. 
114.  STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 4-7.6(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. § 4-7.6 cmt. 
117.  Id. 
118.  United States v. Pugh, 436 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
119.  United States v. Fowler, 465 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
120.  A cross-examination is defined as “[t]he questioning of a witness at trial or hearing 
by the party opposed to the party in whose favor the witness has testified” that is meant “to 
discredit a witness before the fact-finder in any of several ways, as by bringing out 
contradictions and improbabilities in earlier testimony, by suggesting doubts to the witness, 
and by trapping the witness into admissions that weaken the testimony.”  Cross-examination, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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doubt on the witness’s version of events.  The reason for this is simply 
that every question that is asked is done so with a good faith basis.  The 
crux of the good faith basis rule in each of the three sets of standards 
requires that a cross-examiner possess a certain degree of evidence that 
supports the underlying factual predicate upon which each question is 
based.121  In the previously provided true-facts cross-examination,122 
every question asked is designed to elicit a truthful response and is 
supported by actual evidence.  For example, when the lawyer asks, “It 
was dark out?”—the lawyer knows it was dark out at 7:00 p.m. in 
February.  Or when the lawyer asks about Officer Drebin being on 
probation with Internal Affairs, the lawyer knows this is, in fact, true.  
While the lawyer may use the witness’s truthful answers during closing 
argument to suggest both the implausibility of the witness’s story and his 
motive to fabricate it, as Professor Steven Lubet has observed, the good 
faith basis rule allows lawyers “to use their questions to intimate all 
manner of guilt-negating possibilities, but only on the basis of truthful 
answers.”123   
b. The False-Story Cross-Examination Is Unethical  
However, the previously provided false-story cross-examination that 
is designed to place before the jury a story in the form of explicit 
suggestions that defense counsel knows to be false is plainly unethical.  
This is because the defense attorney’s questions are not premised on a 
good faith basis.  Instead, defense counsel knows that he is planting a 
version of events in the jury’s mind by forcing the witness to deny the 
answer suggested by each question.124  For example, in the Cassidy case, 
when the defense attorney asks Officer Drebin a question about 
planting the gun on the defendant, or suggests that the defendant posed 
no danger to the officer because the defendant was never in possession 
of a gun in the first place, the attorney knows both of these suggestions 
 
121.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 4-7.6(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). 
122.  See supra Part III.A.2.a. 
123.  Lubet, supra note 108, at 365. 
124.  See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-7.6 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (describing how such questioning is 
unethical). 
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are false.  He most certainly, in the words of one court, does not have a 
“well reasoned suspicion that a circumstance is true.”125 
c. The False-Implication and Evidence-Reflects Closing Arguments Are 
Ethical  
In each of the three closing arguments thus far described in this 
Article, defense counsel is advancing a false defense by asking the fact 
finder to disbelieve the prosecution’s witness whom defense counsel 
knows is telling the truth.  However, of these techniques, the false-
implication and evidence-reflects techniques are ethically permissible, 
while the false-story technique is not.   
In terms of the false-implication and evidence-reflects closing 
arguments, it is essential to note that the closing arguments only ask the 
jury to draw reasonable inferences based entirely on the existence of 
admissible evidence, without ever explicitly telling the jury something 
the defense attorney knows to be untrue.  In this sense, both types of 
closing arguments present the jury with an alternative version of events, 
without technically asserting the truth of those alternatives.  Even 
though these types of closing arguments attempt to create a false 
impression by asking the jury to draw a series of knowingly false 
inferences concerning the witness’s version of events, this attempt to 
mislead the jury is entirely within the limits of existing ethical guidelines.   
Neither the false implication nor evidence reflects closing arguments 
violate Model Rule 3.4(e) or Restatement section 107 and their 
prohibition against alluding “to any matter . . . that will not be supported 
by admissible evidence.”126  In fact, each false inference the jury is asked 
to draw in both types of closing arguments is supported by admissible 
evidence.  For example, when defense counsel suggests that Officer 
Drebin’s story is incredible because of the difficulty of seeing the gun in 
dark lighting conditions and by pointing out that Officer Drebin had a 
motive to fabricate his testimony, those inferences are supported by the 
evidence in the actual trial record concerning the lighting conditions and 
the officer’s problems with Internal Affairs.   
 
125.  United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 658 (D.C. Cir.1980). 
126.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000); see also Blinka, supra note 108, at 10 (noting that some legal commentators believe 
that Model Rule 3.4(e) was intended to apply to opening and closing arguments). 
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Further, the false-implication and evidence-reflects closing 
arguments do not violate Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) or (3) regarding Candor 
to the Tribunal.127  While the rule itself does not specifically indicate that 
it applies to closing arguments,128 commentators and courts have 
interpreted the rule to apply to this particular phase of the trial 
process.129  Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) provides that a “lawyer shall not 
knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.”130  Model 
Rule 3.3(a)(3) provides that a lawyer cannot offer evidence that is 
known to be false.131  A close examination of both types of closing 
arguments indicates that defense counsel attempted neither.   
First, neither closing argument violates the plain language of Model 
Rule 3.3(a)(1) because defense counsel never makes any false 
statements of fact.  In terms of the false-implication closing argument, 
when defense counsel states that in order to find the defendant guilty 
the jury “must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the police officer 
saw the firearm on a dark street,” that statement is undeniably true 
based on the facts of the case as developed on cross-examination.  
Defense counsel never explicitly states that the officer did not see the 
gun or that the defendant is factually innocent of the crime.  Further, the 
lawyer does not state that the police officer actually planted the gun on 
the defendant.  Instead, the lawyer only implies such by asking the jury 
to draw this inference.  He does this by stating something that is 
technically true.  He says, “You must also consider that this officer had a 
lot to lose if he was found to have shot an unarmed citizen,” and defense 
counsel also says, “Officer Drebin has a much better chance of not being 
fired or charged with a crime if the person he shot just so happened to 
have had a gun rather than once again shooting an unarmed civilian.”  
Indeed, most reasonable people can accept as a general truism that 
 
127.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1), (3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
128.  Id. 
129.  See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-7.7 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (cross-referencing its regulation of 
closing argument with the Model Rule 3.3(a)(1)); see also Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 
469 (Ind. 2012) (applying Indiana’s adoption of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 
3.3(a)(1) to arguments made before the jury in the penalty phase of a death penalty trial); 
Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1063 (referencing Model Rule 3.3 and noting that 
“advocates may neither offer nor argue evidence they know to be false”); Suni, supra note 9, 
at 1662–64 (analyzing the application of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 to 
closing arguments in which defense counsel argues false inferences from true facts). 
130.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
131.  Id. at r. 3.3(a)(3). 
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police officers who shoot unarmed citizens without sufficient 
justification can end up in serious trouble.   
Admittedly, the evidence-reflects closing argument appears 
somewhat closer to making a false statement and, therefore, closer to 
the ethical line than the false-implication closing argument.  However, 
an analysis of the evidence-reflects type of closing argument indicates 
that it does not contain statements that are false.  In this regard, it is 
possible that the evidence produced at trial legitimately reflects a 
particular inference, even if that inference is, in actuality, false.  So, 
when defense counsel states, “The evidence demonstrates that the 
police officer could not see the firearm on a dark street with poor 
lighting conditions,” or “The evidence reflects that Officer Drebin 
planted that gun on my client,” these are legitimate inferences that can 
be drawn from the evidence.  Therefore, these are true statements, 
despite the fact that it may not have been what actually happened, or 
the fact finder may choose to believe otherwise.  After all, it can be 
argued that the evidence does indeed demonstrate that a person would 
have difficulty seeing the handle of a gun on a dark street from forty-
five feet away.  Further, because of the officer’s motive to fabricate, 
coupled with questions regarding the lighting conditions and the heavy 
gun being held in the elastic waistband of the defendant’s sweatpants, an 
argument can be made that the evidence also reflects that the officer 
planted the gun to justify the shooting (even if in actuality this is not the 
case).   
Second, while the false-implication and evidence-reflects closing 
arguments entail defense counsel stringing together a series of true facts 
in order to draw false inferences, the history of Model Rule 3.3 indicates 
that the rule itself was not intended to construe this type of potentially 
misleading argument as a false statement.132  “An early draft of the 
Model Rules would have created an explicit obligation for lawyers to 
avoid creating misleading impressions through advocacy,” but this 
prohibition was deliberately not incorporated into the current version of 
the Model Rules.133   
Lastly, in terms of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), no matter how misleading a 
closing argument may be, a closing argument itself cannot be construed 
as an affirmative act of offering false evidence.  This is because the rules 
 
132.  CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.3.4 (1986) (citing MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1980)). 
133.  Id. 
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of trial practice make clear that a closing argument is not itself 
evidence.134   
Model Rule 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.”135  One could argue that attempting to convince the 
jury of an alternative version of events that the lawyer knows to be false, 
particularly when this alternative version of events involves implying 
misconduct and untruthfulness on the part of another, constitutes 
dishonesty or misrepresentation.  While once again evidencing the 
vagueness of the Model Rules, the rule itself fails to define whether its 
application extends to cross-examination or closing argument.136  
However, it does not appear that lawyers are disciplined under Model 
Rule 8.4(c) for arguing false inferences, so long as they are based on 
true facts.137  As Professor Ellen Yankiver Suni has noted, “It seems 
likely that . . . what is within the range of appropriate litigation conduct 
in criminal cases are incorporated into the interpretation of this 
Rule.”138 
Restatement section 120 uses language very similar to that of Model 
Rule 3.3 in prohibiting lawyers from making false statements of fact or 
offering false evidence.139  For the same reasons as those noted above, 
the carefully worded false-implication and evidence-reflects closing 
arguments contain no false statements of fact and do not involve the 
 
134.  The jury instruction in the Third Circuit is representative of the typical jury 
instruction addressing this point.  THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, 
§ 1.08 (2009).  This particular provision of the Third Circuit jury instruction addressing closing 
argument reads in pertinent part, “The evidence from which you are to find the facts consists 
of the following: (1) The testimony of the witnesses . . . .  The following are not evidence: (1) 
Statements and arguments of the lawyers for the parties in this case . . . .”  Id.; see also 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A 
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3:3:208 (2d ed. Supp. 
1998) (positing that “false evidence” in Model Rule 3.3 relates only to perjury and not to false 
implications from true facts). 
135.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
136.  Id. 
137.  Suni, supra note 9, at 1663 n.91. 
138.  Id. 
139.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) reads in relevant part,  
A lawyer may not: (a) knowingly counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely or 
otherwise to offer false evidence; (b) knowingly make a false statement of fact to the 
tribunal; (c) offer testimony or other evidence as to an issue of fact known by the 
lawyer to be false. 
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lawyer offering any false evidence.  In terms of the misleading argument 
fashioned out of the witness’s truthful testimony, the comment to 
section 120 notes that “[a] lawyer may make conditional or 
suppositional statements so long as they are so identified and are neither 
known to be false nor made without a reasonable basis in fact for their 
conditional or suppositional character.”140  Professor Suni has further 
noted that the commentary to this section “supports the application” 
that Restatement section 120 was intended to apply “only to actual false 
evidence and false statements and not generally to false implications 
from true facts.”141   
ABA Standard 4-7.7 regulates defense attorney conduct during 
closing argument.  ABA Standard 4-7.7 states, “In closing argument to 
the jury, defense counsel may argue all reasonable inferences from the 
evidence in the record.  Defense counsel should not intentionally 
misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may 
draw.”142  For example, in the Cassidy case, even though Officer Drebin 
testified truthfully, defense counsel’s suggestions, made in both the 
false-implication and evidence-reflects closing arguments, are all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.  When the 
lawyer argues that Officer Drebin’s testimony is incredible because he 
could not see a gun in the dark lighting conditions, because the weight of 
the gun was too much for the defendant to hold, and because Officer 
Drebin had a motive to fabricate his testimony, these are all “reasonable 
inferences” that could be drawn “from the evidence in the record.”143   
Further, the comment to ABA Standard 4-7.7 sheds light on what 
the standard means by “mislead[ing] the jury as to inferences it may 
draw.”144  The comment to ABA Standard 4-7.7 notes that “[t]he 
obligation to avoid misrepresentation is broad” and provides the 
 
140.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120, cmt. f, illus. 5 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
141.  See Suni, supra note 9, at 1663.  Professor Suni’s analysis relates to Restatement 
section 180, which at the time of analysis was only in the draft stages.  Id. at 1663 n.92.  
Restatement section 120 is the current version of the old Restatement section 180.  The 
language of the draft version, as well as the commentary, is nearly identical to the current 
version.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 180 (AM. LAW 
INST., Tentative Draft. No. 8 1997). 
142.  STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 4-7.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. § 4-7.7. 
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following example of misleading the jury: “An argument to the jury that 
the accused has a ‘clean record’ when counsel is aware of prior 
convictions, although the evidence is silent, is an affirmative 
misrepresentation of a fact.”145  This example suggests that the ABA 
Standards’ view of misleading the jury as to inferences it may draw is 
defined as explicit statements made by defense counsel that he knows to 
be untrue, despite the fact that such an inference may find support in the 
trial record itself.  In this sense, ABA Standard 4-7.7 appears to draw a 
parallel between itself and the reference to false statements contained in 
Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) and the comment even cites to Model Rule 
3.3(a)(1) in providing the above example.146  For reasons previously 
 
145.  Id. § 4-7.7 cmt. 
146.  Id. § 4-7.7 cmt. n.2.  It should be noted that during the writing of this Article the 
third edition of the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function were in effect.  
However, a fourth edition has been more recently released.  As of this writing, the fourth 
edition of the ABA Standards has not been released with commentary.  In some capacity, this 
makes it difficult to ascertain the true extent and meaning of each new or revised standard.  
With this in mind, the fourth edition has added the following standard: ABA Standard 4-1.4 
Defense Counsel’s Tempered Duty of Candor, which states: 
(b) Defense counsel should not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law or 
offer false evidence, to a court, lawyer, witnesses, or third party.  It is not a false 
statement for defense counsel to suggest inferences that may reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence.  In addition, while acting to accommodate legitimate 
confidentiality, privilege, or other defense concerns, defense counsel should correct 
a defense representation of material fact or law that defense counsel knows is, or 
later learns was, false. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2015), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourth
Edition.html [perma.cc/GN76-DX2Z]. 
Further, ABA Standard 4-7.7 has been modified and renumbered as ABA Standard 4-
7.8.  This standard reads in relevant part: 
(a) In closing argument to a jury (or to a judge sitting as trier of fact), defense 
counsel may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.  
Defense counsel should, to the extent time permits, review the evidence in the 
record before presenting closing argument.  Defense counsel should not knowingly 
misstate the evidence in the record, or argue inferences that counsel knows have no 
good-faith support in the record. 
Id.  Again, the full meaning of these standards can be better understood when they are fully 
released with commentary.  However, for the purposes of the instant discussion, it seems 
unlikely that the addition of ABA Standard 4-1.4 and the revisions contained in ABA 
Standard 4-7.8 are intended to materially change the third edition’s prohibition on misleading 
the jury through the use of explicitly false statements during closing argument—as doing so 
would place the ABA’s Standards of Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense 
Function in sharp contrast to the ethical prohibitions against making false statements 
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noted in discussing Model Rule 3.3,147 both closing arguments contain 
true statements and therefore do not violate the misleading the jury 
provision of ABA Standard 4-7.7.   
d. The False-Story Closing Argument Is Unethical  
Unlike the false-implication and evidence-reflects closing arguments, 
the false-story closing argument more strongly presents the defense 
theory in story form through a series of affirmative statements that 
defense counsel knows to be untrue.148  For example, unqualified 
statements such as, “My client is innocent”; “Here’s what really 
happened”; “Officer Drebin is lying”; or “After he realized my client 
never had a gun in the first place, Police Officer Drebin planted the gun 
on my client,” are obviously not true as defense counsel knows that the 
version of events he is telling the jury is not what happened and that his 
client did in fact have a gun on his person.  The entire false-story 
argument is premised on presenting an alternative version of events in 
which defense counsel explicitly asserts the truth of those alternatives, 
knowing them to be false.   
In assessing whether this type of closing argument is ethical, the 
false-story closing argument does not appear to violate Model Rule 
3.4(e) or Restatement section 107 and the prohibition against alluding 
“to any matter . . . that will not be supported by admissible evidence.”149  
In a technical sense, while the defense attorney may know the closing 
argument is based on untruths, each inference he is asking the jury to 
draw does, to the outside observer, appear to literally be supported by 
admissible evidence.  For example, when the defense attorney 
affirmatively tells the jury that Officer Drebin planted the gun to avoid 
being fired, that inference is supported by the fact that the evidence on 
the record shows that Internal Affairs told Officer Drebin that one more 
unjustified shooting and his employment would be terminated.   
However, the false-story closing argument is unethical because of 
the manner in which these inferences are phrased and presented to the 
jury.  As detailed above, Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), Restatement section 120 
and ABA Standard 4-7.7 all prohibit defense counsel from making false 
 
contained in Rule 3.3 (a)(1) of the ABA’s own Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
147.  Supra Part III.A.2.a. 
148.  See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 344. 
149.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
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statements to the judge or jury.150  For example, in addressing the 
specific issue of the defense counsel’s explicit statement that the client is 
innocent, one legal commentator has stated, “In closing argument, 
because Rule 3.3 states that ‘[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a 
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal,’ it would seem that a lawyer 
who knows her client is guilty cannot explicitly claim that he is 
innocent.”151  However, in addition to explicitly stating the client’s 
innocence, the false-story closing argument presented above involves a 
host of other explicit statements the trial attorney knows to be untrue.  
Because the telling of this false story is based on a series of knowingly 
false statements, the structure of this type of closing argument violates 
each of the three ethical provisions identified above.152   
Moreover, because the false-story closing argument clearly violates 
Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), it likely violates Model Rule 8.4(c) and its 
prohibition against engaging in conduct that involves “dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation.”153  This is also true of Model Rule 8.4(d), 
which prohibits conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.154  A violation of Rule 3.3(a) may be prejudicial to the 
administration of justice in that a lawyer’s dishonesty “may cause the 
public to lose confidence in both lawyers and the judicial system as a 
whole.”155  Indeed, numerous decisions have held that a lawyer who 
violates Model Rule 3.3(a) generally violates both 8.4(c) and (d).156   
 
150.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
§ 4-7.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). 
151.  K. Craig Welkener, Note, Possible but Not Easy: Living the Virtues and Defending 
the Guilty, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1088 (2013) (alteration in original).  
152.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
§ 4-7.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993); see also supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (indicating 
that ABA Standard 4-7.7 and its prohibition against misleading the jury as to inferences it 
may draw, references Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) and indicates that “an affirmative 
misrepresentation of a fact” is one in which defense counsel makes an explicit representation 
to the jury that they know to be untrue despite the fact such an inference could be drawn 
from the trial record). 
153.  Douglas R. Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous Advocacy: Civility, Candor and 
Parlor Tricks, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 3, 28 (2002) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014)). 
154.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
155.  Richmond, supra note 153, at 28–29. 
156.  See, e.g., In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975, 980 (Ariz. 1995) (censuring lawyers who are not 
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C. A Normative Critique of the Ethical Rules As Applied to Discrediting 
the Truthful Witness 
1. How to Ethically Discredit the Truthful Witness  
The above exploration of existing ethical rules and standards makes 
clear that there is a perfectly ethical way in which to advance a false 
defense by discrediting the truthful witness on both cross-examination 
and closing argument.  This can be done without running afoul of any 
existing ethical rules or standards by combining the true-facts cross-
examination and the false-implication or evidence-reflects closing 
arguments.  Of these two types of closing arguments, criminal defense 
attorneys can decide whether the false-implication or evidence-reflects 
type of closing argument is the most effective type of closing argument 
based on their own personal style and opinion.   
For the reasons previously detailed, cross-examination that is 
designed to only elicit truthful responses from the witness, even if those 
responses may later be used to create a false impression during closing 
argument, will not violate the good faith basis rule that is at the core of 
the ethical guidelines regulating cross-examination.157  Further, a closing 
argument that asks the jury to draw false inferences from true facts is 
ethically permissible so long as the attorney never explicitly makes a 
false statement of fact.158   
2. Current Ethics Rules Reflect a Reasonable Compromise Between 
Competing Values  
That the combinations of the ethical techniques described above, 
which allow for the truthful witness to be discredited without actually 
lying to the jury, happens to be ethically permissible is not surprising.159  
 
honest with settlement judge for violating Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c)); In re Hansen, 877 P.2d 
802, 804–06  (Ariz. 1994) (lawyer who lied to court about reason for witness’s absence 
violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)); People v. Reed, 955 P.2d 65, 67–68 (Colo. 
1998) (suspending lawyer who forged another lawyer’s signature on court documents 
pursuant to Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 731 
A.2d 447, 456–57 (Md. 1999) (holding that a lawyer who lied in deposition and lied to the 
judge violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)).  
157.  See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
158.  See supra Part III.B.2.c. 
159.  It is worth noting that a certain inconsistency exists in terms of how current ethics 
rules allow for truthful witnesses to be discredited in the course of arguing false implications.  
A criminal defense attorney is required to ask questions that are premised on a good faith 
basis, yet with certain limitations, he can make closing arguments that are not supported by 
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For reasons further explained in this section, the combination of the 
true-facts cross-examination and these two types of closing arguments as 
a means of discrediting the truthful witness is consistent with the 
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to challenge the weight of the 
state’s evidence,160 as well as the truth-seeking function of a criminal 
trial161 and the lawyer’s corresponding obligation of candor to the 
tribunal.162  In this sense, the construction of current ethics rules in the 
context of discrediting the truthful witness represent a sound and 
reasonable balance between these competing interests.   
Indeed, the American criminal justice system is defined by differing 
goals, which at times are in tension with each other.  For the purposes of 
the instant discussion, there are two competing goals worth noting.  The 
first goal relates to the criminal justice system’s search for the truth.163  
However, this goal can at times be in tension with a second goal of the 
criminal justice system—the goal of protecting the innocent, even if that 
means vigorously defending the guilty and in the process obscuring the 
truth.164   
The question of whether the central purpose of a criminal trial is to 
seek the truth is one that has pointedly divided legal scholars.165  Some 
 
the same good faith basis and that he may know to be affirmatively false.  However, this 
inconsistency can be explained in relation to the criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.  
As noted previously, the good faith basis requirement for questions asked on cross-
examination is not a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to confront their accuser.  
See United States v. Beck, 625 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2010).  However, the criminal defendant 
does have a constitutional right to challenge the weight of the evidence presented by the state 
at closing argument—even if that means arguing a false implication from true facts.  The 
contours of this constitutional right are explained in greater detail in this section.  
160.  See supra note 15 (defining what is meant by the term weight of the evidence); see 
also Subin, supra note 27 (noting the defendant’s constitutional right to challenge the state’s 
evidence).  This point will also be greatly expanded upon in this section. 
161.  David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert 
Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 494 (1992) (noting that 
of the goals that the criminal justice system is designed to promote “one goal emerges as 
preeminent: finding the truth”). 
162.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 3.3, 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
163.  Harris, supra note 161, at 494. 
164.  Id. at 496–97 (“Note that the goal of protecting the innocent may exist in tension 
with the goal of truth finding.”). 
165.  See Kenneth W. Starr, Truth and Truth-Telling, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 901, 902–
903 (1999).  Starr describes a 1997 debate at Yale Law School between Professor Alan 
Dershowitz and Akhil Reed Amar.  Id.  Professor Dershowitiz argued that truth is an 
occasional byproduct of our criminal justice system, but not a goal in its own right.  Id. 902–
03.  Professor Amar argued that truth is intended to the paramount objective of the criminal 
justice system.  Id. at 903. 
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scholars contend that the primary purpose of the criminal justice system 
is to search for the truth.166  These scholars find support for this position 
in noting the development of rules of procedure, substantive law, and 
rules of evidence (with the exception of excluding evidence obtained in 
violation of constitutional rights and evidentiary privileges), which they 
contend are primarily designed to advance the search for the truth.167   
Despite this fact, the criminal justice system does endeavor to 
promote other non-truth related goals.168  As noted previously,169 one of 
these competing goals relates directly to protecting the innocent, which 
paradoxically can be achieved by zealously defending the guilty and, in 
the process, undermining the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial.170  
The argument that zealous defense of the guilty protects the factually 
innocent is premised on the belief that if the prosecutor knows that the 
defense attorney will vigorously attack the government’s case, the 
prosecutor will either be unwilling to bring weak cases to trial in which 
the defendant may be innocent, or will alternatively seek the strongest 
evidence possible in order to ensure the accuracy of a guilty verdict.171   
 
166.  See Harris, supra note 161, at 494. 
167.  See Starr, supra note 165, at 903; see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (4th 
ed. 1992) (“The overwhelming majority of all rules of evidence have as their ultimate 
justification some tendency to promote the objectives set forward in the conventional witness’ 
oath, the presentation of ‘the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.’”). 
168.  See Harris, supra note 161, at 494–503.  These goals include protecting the 
innocent, respecting individual dignity, equal justice, and maintenance of an accusatorial 
system.  Id. 
169.  See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
170.  See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257–58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in 
part, concurring in part) (“Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put 
the State to its proof, to put the State’s case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he 
thinks or knows to be the truth.”); see also Harris, supra note 161, at 496 (noting that in 
defending the guilty we “seek to minimize the chances of the erroneous conviction of an 
innocent person, even at the price of a greater chance that a jury may acquit a guilty person”). 
171.  See Subin, supra note 1, at 148–49; see also Mitchell, supra note 17, at 347 (“By 
pushing hard in every case (whether the client is factually guilty or not) and thereby raising 
‘reasonable doubts’ in the prosecution’s case whenever possible, the defense attorney helps 
‘make the screens work’ and thus protects the interests of the factually innocent.”).  It should 
be noted the above justifications relate only to vigorously defending the guilty.  The 
importance of challenging the state’s case when the defendant insists on his innocence is that 
in vigorously confronting the accusation made against the accused, the truth can ultimately be 
exposed and the innocent protected from undue punishment.  Perhaps this logic is best 
articulated in this well-known maxim: “cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth.’”  Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (quoting 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).  Of course, rarely are those who insist on 
defending the innocent asked to justify such actions for obvious reasons.  
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While rules of procedure, substantive law, and evidentiary rules may 
be designed to further the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial, the 
goal of protecting the innocent at the expense of punishing the guilty, 
even to the detriment of the truth, is enshrined in the Constitution 
itself.172   
First, the Constitution dictates that government is required to meet 
the high burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, even if 
that means that a guilty defendant may go free, in order to ensure that 
an innocent defendant is not wrongfully convicted.173  Second, the 
defendant is given the right to actively participate in the trial process by 
challenging the weight of the state’s evidence in order to convince the 
fact finder that the state has not met this burden.174  Importantly, this 
constitutional right is extended in equal measure to the guilty and 
innocent alike.175  The criminal defendant’s right to actively challenge 
the weight of the state’s evidence, specifically on cross-examination and 
 
172.  See Harris, supra note 161, at 496–97 (noting that, in addition to the proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard, “[a] number of rules of constitutional dimension protect the 
innocent”).  This Article offers its own analysis of what those other constitutional dimensions 
are in greater detail in this section. 
173.  Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (“[T]he prosecution must bear the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt ‘the existence of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged.’” (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)).  “The 
reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.  
It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.”  In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.  The Winship Court further held that the  
use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and 
confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law.  It is critical that 
the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves 
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. 
Id. at 364; see also Harris, supra note 161, at 496 (noting that the reasonable doubt standard 
reflects our “fundamental value determination” that “it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free.” (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., 
concurring))). 
174.  Mitchell, supra note 17, at 344 (“Under our constitutional system, I do not need to 
try to convince the factfinder about the truth of any factual propositions.  I need only try to 
convince the factfinder that the prosecution has not met its burden.”). 
175.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 256–57 (White, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) 
(“[Defense counsel] must be and is interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, 
but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his client whether he is 
innocent or guilty.”); United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e 
agree that defense counsel should represent his client vigorously, regardless of counsel’s view 
of guilt or innocence . . . .”). 
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closing argument, is found in two separate, but related, aspects of the 
Sixth Amendment.176   
The first of these rights is the right to confront one’s accuser through 
the use of cross-examination.177  As the United States Supreme Court 
noted in Davis v. Alaska,178 “Cross-examination is the principal means 
by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are 
tested.”179  The Davis Court went on to note that “the cross-examiner is 
not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ 
perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been 
allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.”180 
The second of these Sixth Amendment rights relates to the 
defendant’s ability to challenge the strength of the state’s case at closing 
argument, which has generally been found within the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel.181  The right to be heard at closing 
argument further allows defense counsel to argue all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence contained in the trial 
record.182   
Therefore, because the above rights are constitutional mandates, the 
guilty defendant’s right to challenge the weight of the state’s evidence 
must be incorporated into existing ethics rules.183  As noted by the 
 
176.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see supra note 121, 160 and accompanying text. 
177.  The Confrontation Clause found within the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
178.  415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
179.  Id. at 316.  Of course, there are reasonable limits placed on the right of cross-
examination.  For the purposes of the instant discussion, see supra note 159 (noting that the 
requirement that one have good faith basis for questions asked on cross-examination does not 
violate the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation). 
180.  Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. 
181.  See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 860 (1975) (“The Constitutional right of a 
defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily includes his right to have his counsel make 
a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in his favor, however simple, clear, 
unimpeached, and conclusive the evidence may seem . . . .” (quoting Yopps v. State 178 A.2d 
880 (Md. 1962))). 
182.  See Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455, 468 (Fla. 2004) (“Closing argument presents 
an opportunity for both the State and the defendant to argue all reasonable inferences that 
might be drawn from the evidence.”). 
183.  The United States Supreme Court has previously invalidated state rules of 
professional conduct that unduly restricted a constitutional right.  Notably this occurred in the 
Court’s landmark decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), where the 
Court held that blanket state prohibitions contained in Arizona’s attorney discipline rules on 
lawyer advertising were unconstitutional violations of free speech. 
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drafters of the Model Rules themselves, the construction of the Model 
Rules reflects the “constitutional principle that the state must prove 
every element of the crime charged and may not, by procedural rule or 
otherwise, shift its burden to the defendant.”184  For its part, Model Rule 
3.1, relating to frivolous legal arguments, provides that, even if counsel 
knows his client is guilty, “[a] lawyer for the defendant in a criminal 
proceeding . . . may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require 
that every element of the case be established.”185  Restatement section 
110 uses virtually identical language to Model Rule 3.1.186   
While the ABA Standards do not directly address defense counsel’s 
role in requiring that the state prove each element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt,187 ABA Standard 4-7.6, relating to cross-examination, 
cites approvingly to Justice White’s often quoted opinion in United 
States v. Wade188 in which he states that defense counsel may test the 
quality of the prosecution’s evidence on cross-examination even if the 
defense attorney knows his client is guilty and the witness has testified 
truthfully.189  Justice White famously wrote of the defense lawyer: 
If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him 
appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his 
normal course.  Our interest in not convicting the innocent 
permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State’s 
case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or 
knows to be the truth.  Undoubtedly there are some limits which 
defense counsel must observe but more often than not, defense 
 
184.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Proposed Final 
Draft 1981). 
185.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
186.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000).  The commentary to this section notes: 
[A] lawyer defending a person accused of a crime, even if convinced that the guilt of 
the offense charged can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, may require the 
prosecution to prove every element of the offense, including those facts as to which 
the lawyer knows the accused can present no effective defense. 
Id. § 110 cmt. f. 
187.  STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993). 
188.  388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
189.  STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 4-7.6 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 257–58 (White, J., 
dissenting in part, concurring in part)). 
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counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach 
him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just 
as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying.  In 
this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as part 
of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we 
countenance or require conduct which in many instances has 
little, if any, relation to the search for truth.190 
The example provided in this Article demonstrates how existing 
ethics rules must allow defense counsel to challenge the weight of the 
evidence by discrediting the truthful witness and arguing a false defense.  
After all, doing so is a constitutional right.191   
In Commonwealth v. Cassidy, the evidence presented by the State is 
legally sufficient in that, if the police officer’s testimony is believed, it 
proves every element of the crime charged.192  The defense attorney 
knows his client is guilty and the defendant insists on a trial and will not 
testify.  Because the evidence is legally sufficient if believed, the only 
possible theory of defense is to convince the fact finder that the officer’s 
testimony is not worthy of belief.   
However, this cannot be done through the false-story cross-
examination and false-story closing arguments because they are ethically 
prohibited.193  Further, the defendant would not prevail on a claim that 
he had a constitutional right to an attorney who makes knowingly false 
statements of fact to the jury.194  Therefore, if the defense attorney could 
not attack the weight of the state’s evidence—by eliciting only truthful 
answers on cross-examination and then arguing that the jury should 
draw certain inferences based only on defense counsel’s true 
statements—the defense attorney would have no way of challenging the 
weight of the prosecution’s evidence once he knows his client is guilty.  
Such a predicament would be inconsistent with the long held 
constitutional principle that even the guilty defendant is entitled to force 
the state to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a 
 
190.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 257–58 (White, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) 
(footnotes omitted). 
191.  See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 344. 
192.  For the difference between sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence, 
see supra note 15. 
193.  See supra Part III.B.2.b, d. 
194.  See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
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reasonable doubt195 and that in doing so defense counsel may, in the 
Justice White’s famous words, attempt to put the “State’s case in the 
worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the 
truth.”196   
Additionally, attacking the credibility or accuracy of a truthful 
witness is not only ethically permitted using the techniques 
demonstrated in this Article, in some instances, it is even ethically 
required.197  When challenging the weight of the evidence by discrediting 
the truthful witness is the best or the only possible defense, the 
prevailing view is that defense counsel is ethically required to do so in 
order to fulfill the obligation of zealous advocacy owed to one’s client.198 
However, current ethics rules do more than simply reflect the 
defendant’s constitutional rights to challenge the quality of the state’s 
evidence by discrediting the truthful witness.199  These rules are also 
designed to further the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial that is 
reflected in the development of substantive criminal law, rules of 
 
195.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 256–58 (White, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
196.  Id. at 258. 
197.  See Henning, supra note 8, at 271. 
198.  Id. (“The duty of zealous representation calls for the attorney to use all legal 
means to obtain a favorable outcome for the client, which can include using tactics that lead a 
jury to conclude mistakenly that the person is not guilty of the offense, because the 
government has not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  To achieve that 
result, the defense lawyer may try to have the jury draw a false inference, perhaps by calling 
into question a witness’s credibility or by convincing the jury of an alternate theory of what 
actually happened—or why—that precludes a finding of guilt.”); see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).  A previous formulation of the ABA’s ethics 
code described an attorney’s obligation to his client by using the phrase “zealous advocacy” in 
Canon 7.  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Cannon 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1979); 
George A. Riemer, Zealous Lawyers: Saints or Sinners?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1998, at 31.  
However, in the most recent formulation, Canon 7 has been replaced with Model Rule 1.3, 
which replaced the word “zealous” with the word “diligence.”  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).  Nevertheless, it is common practice for attorneys to 
refer to the obligation to zealously represent their clients.  In all likelihood this is because far 
from truly abandoning the concept of zealous advocacy, four references are made to the 
concept of zeal in the preamble, commentary, and legal background material within the 
overall text of the Model Rules.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope, r. 1.3 
cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
Further, while beyond the scope of this particular Article, it is worth noting that in such a 
predicament, defense counsel’s failure to challenge the weight of the evidence by discrediting 
the truthful witness may not only violate the ethical obligation of diligent or zealous 
advocacy, it might also represent a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
199.  See Henning, supra note 8, at 210 (“The regulations for lawyers must deal with 
every type of legal representation, and not simply when a lawyer stands up in court.”). 
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procedure, and rules of evidence.200  Ethics rules accomplish this task by 
mandating that the lawyer is an officer of the court and, therefore, must 
exercise candor in his dealings with the judge and jury.201  Therefore, in 
his role as an officer of the court, the lawyer’s responsibilities in 
defending his client cannot be entirely divorced from the truth-seeking 
function of a criminal trial.202   
Presumably, ethics rules could be written to expressly allow 
attorneys to ask questions on cross-examination in the absence of a 
good faith basis and to likewise make false statements to the tribunal 
during closing argument.  Constitutional concerns dictate only that 
ethics rules be written in such a way as to ensure that the defendant is 
able to force the government to prove every element of its case beyond 
a reasonable doubt.203  Consistent with this constitutional dictate, even 
the guilty defendant must be allowed to challenge the weight of the 
state’s evidence.204  While the defendant has no constitutional right to 
have his lawyer knowingly lie to the jury,205 or to ask questions in the 
absence of a good faith basis,206 if ethics rules expressly allowed for such, 
the defendant’s constitutional rights would not be harmed.  The criminal 
defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated when the defendant is 
given more robust means to challenge the state’s case than required by 
law.207   
 
200.  See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
201.  See Angela Dawson Terry, Note, What’s a Lawyer to Do?: The Tension Between 
Zealous Advocacy and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
357, 359 (1997) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)) 
(“The primary characteristic of the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court is the duty to 
subordinate the interests of the client and the interests of the lawyer to the interests of the 
judicial system and the public.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & 
scope, r. 3.3(a)(3) cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“A lawyer, as a member of the legal 
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen 
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”). 
202.  See Freedman, supra note 2, at 1470 (“The attorney is indeed an officer of the 
court, and he does participate in a search for the truth.”); see also Henning, supra note 8, at 
211. 
203.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
204.  See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. 
205.  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
206.  State v. Marble, 901 P.2d 521, 524 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); see also United States v. 
Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
207.  See Kimberly S. Keller, Privacy Lost: Comparing the Attenuation of Texas’s Article 
I, Section 9 and the Fourth Amendment, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 429, 430 & n.3 (2003) (“The 
federal constitution sets the floor for individual rights” and that state’s may provide their 
citizens with greater rights (quoting Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 
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But current ethics rules are obviously not written in such a way,208 
and need not be.  Instead, these rules constrain the means by which 
criminal defense attorneys undermine the search for the truth and, in 
the process, reflect the relevance of the truth-seeking function of a 
criminal trial and the lawyer’s related obligation of candor to the 
tribunal.   
To that end, current ethics rules endeavor to strike a balance 
between the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial and the 
defendant’s constitutional right to challenge the weight of the state’s 
evidence by arguing a false defense.  That balance can best be summed 
up in the following manner: Lawyers are not required to search for the 
truth and at times may actively work to obscure its discovery, but they 
cannot do so by telling lies.209  In this regard, current ethics rules 
undoubtedly reflect a fair and reasonable compromise between the 
important competing goals and interests that define the contours of the 
American system of criminal justice identified above.   
3. Arguments Against the Balance Reflected in Current Ethics Rules  
It should be noted that not all scholars so readily embrace the 
balance current ethics rules intelligently reflect.210  It may be suggested 
that legitimate and important justifications exist for allowing defense 
attorneys to argue a false defense without regard to the good faith 
nature of the questions being asked on cross-examination and in 
particular for eliminating the requirement that defense counsel not 
make false statements during closing argument.  However, an analysis of 
these arguments demonstrates that they are ultimately unpersuasive.   
To that end, some may contend that ethics rules that require 
different forms of rhetoric on cross-examination and closing argument 
when the client has confessed his guilt punish the client for being honest 
 
1991))).  As explained previously, ethics rules, while largely based on a version of the ABA’s 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct are enacted by individual states.  See supra note 106.  
Therefore, federal constitutional concerns are implicated only when a state’s ethics code 
otherwise restricts rights that are provided for in the Constitution, not when a state provides 
an individual with more expanded rights pursuant to state law.   
208.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
209.  This description of defense counsels duel role as an advocate on behalf of the 
guilty and as an officer of the court exemplifies one scholar’s observation that the “art” of the 
advocate is “the art of misleading an audience without telling lies.”  C.P. HARVEY, THE 
ADVOCATE’S DEVIL 1–2 (1958). 
210.  See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140–43. 
 2015] DISCREDITING THE TRUTHFUL WITNESS 333 
with his lawyer.211  This point is worth noting in light of the fact that the 
proceeding section of this Article posits that attorneys frequently adopt 
unethical forms of cross-examination and closing argument because they 
tend to be more effective from a trial advocacy standpoint.212   
It follows that if the defendant knows that his lawyer must use a less 
effective form of trial advocacy once he has confessed his guilt, the 
defendant would be discouraged from being open and forthright with his 
lawyer.  Not only would this punish the client for being honest with his 
lawyer, it would also cut against the client’s interests because it might 
deprive counsel of favorable information and prevent the lawyer from 
being fully prepared to address the introduction of unfavorable 
evidence.213   
However, the Supreme Court in Nix v. Whiteside214 rejected the 
validity of these arguments when it held that the defendant suffered no 
legally cognizable harm when his lawyer threatened to expose his false 
testimony.215  In drawing a parallel between the issue of punishing the 
client by threating to expose his false testimony and placing limits on the 
means by which the truthful witness is discredited, Professor Murray L. 
Schwartz has argued, “It is hard to see why the client should fare any 
better with respect to impeachment of a truthful witness if the lawyer’s 
knowledge of the truthfulness of that testimony is based substantially, if 
not wholly, upon the client’s disclosure.”216 
Further, it may be suggested that restricting or requiring the use of 
certain words or phrases based upon whether the defendant confessed 
his guilt to his lawyer poses the practical problem of potentially 
signaling to the fact finder during closing argument that the defendant is 
guilty.  For example, the lawyer’s failure to directly state that the client 
is actually innocent may signal to a knowledgeable fact finder that the 
defense attorney knows his client is guilty because the defense attorney 
chose to either preface that statement with qualifying language, or chose 
to state that the client was only “not guilty.”  While concern regarding 
linguistic signaling may be most acute in the context of explicitly stating 
the client’s innocence, it may be suggested that in any given case the use 
 
211.  Id. 
212.  See supra Part IV.A.1, 2. 
213.  Scholars have made a similar point specifically in the context of preventing client 
perjury.  See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1141. 
214.  457 U.S. 157 (1986). 
215.  Id. at 161, 176. 
216.  See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140–41. 
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of qualifying language in the evidence-reflects closing argument, or 
argument by implication in the false-implication closing argument, may 
potentially signal to the knowledgeable fact finder that defense counsel 
is aware of his client’s guilt.  
However, in other aspects of the trial process precedent exists for 
advancing ethical considerations over concerns regarding how a jury 
might interpret defense counsel’s specific advocacy techniques.  An 
example of this paradigm can be found once again in the context of 
client perjury, specifically in the narrative approach to the use of 
perjured testimony.  Under this approach, in order for the lawyer to 
avoid condoning perjury, when the lawyer knows the client will present 
perjured testimony, the client is called to the witness stand and allowed 
to testify in narrative form.217 The lawyer is then prohibited from 
arguing during closing argument those portions of the defendant’s 
testimony that they know to be perjured.218  However, it is understood 
that the awkward presentation of the defendant’s testimony, as well as 
defense’s counsel’s failure to argue such testimony, may send a signal 
that the testimony is not truthful and the defendant’s protestations of 
innocence are not to be believed.219  
Regardless of this concern, the use of the narrative approach to 
potential client perjury enjoys widespread use.220 And, once again, as 
noted above, legal commentators have posited there is little compelling 
reason why ethical concerns in the context of client perjury should be 
treated differently than ethical concerns that may arise in the context of 
discrediting the truthful witness.221 
It may also be suggested that, in allowing for truthful witnesses to be 
discredited while constraining the type of language used during closing 
argument, current ethics rules place undue emphasis on linguistic 
 
217.  See Raymond J. McKoski, Prospective Perjury by a Criminal Defendant: It’s All 
About the Lawyer, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1575, 1623–25 (2012). 
218.  Id. at 1623. 
219.  See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1978) (observing that a 
knowledgeable judge or juror might infer from counsel’s minimal involvement in the 
presentation of the defendant’s testimony that counsel did not believe the witness); Patrick R. 
Grady, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perjury and the Criminal Justice System: The Defendant’s 
Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1985) (arguing that the narrative approach “signals 
to the jury the lawyer’s disbelief of his or her client’s testimony.”).  Regardless of this 
concern, the use of the narrative approach to potential client perjury enjoys widespread use.  
McKoski, supra note 217, at 1624. 
220.  McKoski, supra note 217, at 1624. 
221.  See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 1140–41. 
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precision.  In other words, because ethics rules still allow for attorneys 
to argue false defenses, requiring that they do so through carefully 
crafted rhetoric unnecessarily promotes form over substance. 
However, emphasis on the use of carefully crafted language is a 
necessary component of maintaining the proper balance between the 
defendant’s right to argue a false defense and the defense attorney’s role 
as an officer of the court.  In this regard, scholars have recognized that 
the subtle differences in the rhetoric that may be used to argue the same 
false defense represents the dividing line between an appropriate 
challenge to the prosecution’s case and an inappropriate 
misrepresentation.222   
Moreover, the alternative, i.e., giving criminal defense attorneys the 
express right to make false statements of fact, would not only disturb 
this important balance, it would prove untenable.  In the eyes of many, 
lawyers are already untrustworthy and the legal profession is one of low 
moral and ethical standards.  In fact, 
[t]he popular image is that lawyers, and trial lawyers in 
particular, are cunning deceivers and misleaders, flimflam artists 
who use sly rhetorical skills to bamboozle witnesses, turning 
night into day. In this conception, lawyers tell stories only in 
order to seduce and beguile the hapless jurors who fall prey to 
the advocate’s tricks.223 
If ethics rules were written in such a way that lawyers could ask 
questions in the absence of a good faith basis or make explicit 
statements during closing argument that the lawyer knew to be untrue, 
the standing of the legal profession would suffer even more dramatically 
and such rules would further undermine public confidence in the 
profession as a whole.   
IV. THE (LIMITED) POTENTIAL TO CURB UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR 
A. Understanding the Persistence of Unethical Techniques 
Despite the fact that the truthful witness can be discredited through 
entirely ethical means, courtroom observers have noted that criminal 
 
222.  E.g., Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1064–65. 
223.  STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T, 
CAN’T, AND SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 1 (2001). 
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defense attorneys frequently employ what this Article has termed the 
unethical false-story cross-examination and closing argument.224    
To that end, one of the more frequent ethical abuses that occurs on 
cross-examination is the use of the false-story cross-examination and its 
heavy reliance on asking questions in the absence of a good faith 
basis.225  In listing the common “tricks” employed by trial attorneys on 
cross-examination, Professor Richard H. Underwood observes that 
lawyers frequently ask questions despite the fact that “the lawyer has no 
good faith basis for asking a question that is suggestive of improper 
conduct by the witness.  The lawyer simply invents an outrageous 
scenario and presents it to the jury by way of question.”226  Another 
commentator has referred to the type of cross-examination questions 
that form the basis of the false-story cross-examination as “[o]ne of the 
more insidious tools in the cross-examiner’s arsenal,”227 while noting 
that, “[a]lthough we expect attorneys to adhere to the rules of evidence 
and confine their strategies to the ethical boundaries of the rules, they 
often bend the rules and stretch the strategies.”228   
Further, Professor Harry I. Subin has described as “sanitized” 
closing arguments in which defense counsel refuses to “‘assert’ that facts 
known to him to be false are true.”229  (While Subin has not provided a 
term for these types of closing arguments, this Article has termed them 
the false-implication closing argument.)  Professor Subin then went on 
 
224.  It should be noted that the author’s own experience as a practicing criminal 
defense attorney with over a decade of experience further confirms the observations of the 
legal commenters that are referenced in this section.   
225.  Richard H. Underwood, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 21 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 113, 124–25 (1997); see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Dirty Tricks of Cross-Examination: 
The Influence of Conjectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373, 373–75 
(1990) (referring to cross-examination by innuendo as a frequently employed “dirty trick”); 
Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 121 (1996) 
(discussing common ethics violations that occur on cross-examination and referring to the 
types of questions that form the basis of this Article’s characterization of the false story cross-
examination as a “presumptuous cross-examination question”). 
226.  Underwood, supra note 225, at 124–25. 
227.  See Strier, supra note 225, at 120–21 (“During cross-examination, attorneys employ 
a plethora of nasty and dirty tricks.  Interrogated witnesses are to be pitied, for cross-
examination questions ‘are loaded with unsupported insinuations of improper motives, 
negligence, incompetence, perjury or, worse, suspicion of guilt of the crime for which the 
defendant is on trial.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Rooney, 313 N.E.2d 105, 112 (Mass. 
1974)). 
228.  Id. at 221. 
229.  Subin, supra note 27, at 691. 
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to observe that this type of closing argument “is much more forthright 
than those which most attorneys would give.”230   
Why then do criminal defense attorneys employ the unethical false 
story techniques to advance a false defense when ethical means are 
available?  There are several answers to this question.  As discussed 
below,231 these reasons range from effective trial advocacy and the 
pressures and culture of criminal defense lawyering to the fact that it is 
almost impossible to get caught.232   
1. The Importance of Narrative Structure  
As noted previously, a story or narrative is defined by two important 
elements in that a story or narrative represents a purposefully ordered 
sequence of events designed to achieve a particular goal that explains 
these events by focusing on characters, their goals, and their struggles to 
achieve their goals.233  However, it is not necessary in every case for the 
defense theory to consist of an alternative story to the one being offered 
by the prosecution.   
For example, defense counsel may advance a false defense by 
arguing only that the defendant was misidentified when he was 
randomly picked out of a photo array.  Or the defense attorney may 
argue that the witness is not worthy of belief without offering an 
alternative explanation to the one offered by the state.  In both types of 
scenarios, the defense theory is only that the evidence offered by the 
prosecution is simply not strong enough to conclude, beyond a 
 
230.  Id. (emphasis added). 
231.  See infra Part IV.A.1–4. 
232.  There is also the possibility of an additional explanation.  Using 105 Williams 
College undergraduate students, researchers attempted to determine if “negative 
presumptuous questions” impacted a witness’s credibility.  See Kassin, supra note 225, at 375–
76.  These questions were very similar to this Article’s descriptions of the false-story type of 
questions asked on cross-examination in that the questions implied negative facts and sought 
to damage the credibility of the witnesses through innuendo.  Students read these questions in 
a mock trial transcript.  Id. at 375.  The witnesses were a rape victim and a psychological 
expert.  Id. at 375, 380.  The results of the study are inconclusive.  Id. at 381.  The negative 
presumptuous questions did in fact have a negative impact on the expert witness’s credibility 
but appeared to have no impact on the rape victim’s.  Id. at 380–81.  While the researchers 
attempted to reconcile these results, they ultimately concluded that “[f]urther research is 
needed, however, to determine the factors that moderate these results.  Further research is 
also needed to evaluate the extent to which our findings generalize to real juries.”  Id. at 381.  
Because of the inconclusive nature of these results, it is the author’s opinion that while worth 
noting, further discussion of this study is not warranted in the body of this Article. 
233.  See Posner, supra note 80, at 738–39; supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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reasonable doubt, that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.  
From a trial advocacy perspective, these types of defenses represent a 
one-dimensional challenge to the state’s case because they only suggest 
the evidence alone is too weak to justify a conviction, without offering 
the fact finder an alternative story.   
These types of one-dimensional challenges can be advanced through 
both ethical and unethical means.  In this sense, the telling of a false 
story is not the only unethical way to weaken the testimony of the state’s 
truthful witness.  Pursuant to this Article’s previous discussion,234 even if 
defense counsel chooses not to tell the jury a story, it is still unethical for 
the defense attorney to ask a question without a good faith basis, or to 
explicitly tell the jury something he knew was false.   
However, in order to comport with current ethics rules, the defense 
attorney advancing a one-dimensional challenge to the state’s case in the 
form of a false defense can use the ethical forms of cross-examination 
and closing arguments described previously.  Defense counsel need only 
phrase his questions in such a way as to satisfy the good faith basis 
requirement on cross-examination and during closing argument to avoid 
explicitly telling the fact finder something is true that he knows to be 
false.   
Despite the fact that a one-dimensional challenge can be advanced 
through both ethical and unethical means, the one-dimensional 
challenge is not commonly employed.235  The reason for this is simple: 
defense attorneys have long recognized that it is essential to tell the jury 
a story and, therefore, infrequently launch one-dimensional attacks on 
the prosecution’s evidence.236   
This is because “[w]e are typically able to doubt an explanation only 
when we are persuaded, at least provisionally, of an alternative 
explanation.  Thus, the effective defender cannot simply protest that the 
prosecution has not made its case.  Rather, she must introduce and 
embellish plausible alternatives to the prosecutor’s explanations.”237  To 
that end, narrative structures are a natural mode for understanding the 
human experience.238  In fact, “[p]sychologists are moving towards the 
 
234.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
235.  THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 27 (8th ed. 2010). 
236.  Id. (“Effective storytelling is the basis for much of what occurs during trial . . . . 
Small wonder, then, that good trial lawyers are invariably good storytellers.”). 
237.  David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1760 
(1993). 
238.  J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 
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conclusion that all of our knowledge is contained in stories and in the 
mechanisms to construct and retrieve them.”239   
It is difficult to understate the importance of narrative in the context 
of a criminal trial.  Indeed, “[i]t is now widely accepted, and empirical 
research demonstrates, that narrative plays an important role 
throughout the entire trial process.”240  This is true for two primary 
reasons.241   
First, jurors organize and interpret the evidence presented at trial 
into a story format.242  The process by which evidence is presented in a 
typical criminal trial can be fragmented, often times being presented out 
of logical order and accompanied by discussion concerning evidentiary 
foundations that are themselves unrelated to the case.243  Because stories 
are the most common form of communication, to better understand the 
evidence presented at trial, jurors reduce that evidence into story 
form.244  Story structure also helps jurors reduce the risk of information 
overload “by making it possible to continuously organize and reorganize 
large amounts of constantly changing evidence.”245  Researchers have 
noted, “Stories provide useful structures: plot, characters, time frames, 
 
14 LEGAL WRITING 53, 57 (2008); see also Jonathan K. Van Patten, Storytelling for Lawyers, 
57 S.D. L. REV. 239, 239 & n.2 (2012) (noting that storytelling has an almost “primal” 
relationship to the human condition).  Van Patten supports his description of storytelling as 
“primal” using a passage from Gerry Spence: 
Of course it is all storytelling—nothing more.  It is the experience of the tribe 
around the fire, the primordial genes excited, listening . . . the shivers racing up your 
back to the place where the scalp is made, and then the breathless climax, and the 
sadness and the tears with the dying of the embers, and the silence. 
Gerry L. Spence, How to Make a Complex Case Come Alive for a Jury, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1986, 
at 62, 63. 
239.  Robbins, supra note 85, at 772.  
240.  John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party 
Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1088 (2007). 
241.  For an excellent discussion concerning why narrative plays such an important part 
in the trial process, see id. 
242.  Id. at 1088. 
243.  John B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative Theory: A Proposal for 
Reform, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 599, 612 (2005). 
244.  Blume, supra note 240, at 1088 (citing W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. 
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 164–68 (1981)). 
245.  Id. 
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motives, and settings, which help jurors process and understand what is 
otherwise complex and sometimes unfamiliar information.”246   
Second, during deliberations, juries “re-story” the evidence 
presented during the trial.247  In deciding who should win the case, jurors 
tend to argue with one another in story format.248  What this means is 
that trials are essentially story battles, with the side that tells the best 
story being declared the victor.249   
The above reasons explain why criminal defense attorneys choose 
trial theories that revolve around storytelling and also explain, in part, 
why trial attorneys gravitate toward the false-story techniques.   
However, this Article’s example demonstrates that the ethical forms 
of cross-examination and closing argument can also be used to tell the 
same story as the false-story techniques.  It should be noted that both 
the ethical and unethical types of cross-examinations and closing 
arguments can be designed to advance the same theory of defense—for 
example, in Commonwealth v. Cassidy this theory of defense is that 
Officer Drebin framed Quinton Cassidy.  In both the ethical and 
unethical sets of techniques, this theory is advanced in story form in that 
it is presented as a purposefully ordered sequence of events and 
explained from the perspective of Officer Drebin, the story’s main 
character.  In this sense, beyond simply a one-dimensional challenge, 
ethical forms of cross-examination and closing argument can also be 
used to advance a two-dimensional challenge, in that defense counsel 
can use these techniques to argue not just that the prosecution’s 
evidence is weak but also to imply an alternative story to the one being 
presented by the State.   
Despite this fact, defense attorneys infrequently use ethical forms of 
cross-examination and closing argument when the defense theory 
consists of an alternative story.250  This is because the false story 
techniques represent a better way to tell the story than their ethical, but 
not nearly as effective, storytelling counterparts.251   
In his book, Storytelling for Lawyers, Professor Philip N. Meyer 
noted, “[S]torytellers have understood for millennia, there is a powerful 
 
246.  Id. (citing SUNWOLF, PRACTICAL JURY DYNAMICS 271 (2004)). 
247.  Id. at 1089. 
248.  SUNWOLF, supra note 246, at 272–80. 
249.  See Blume, supra note 240, at 1089. 
250.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
251.  See Rideout, supra note 238, at 57; see also Blume, supra note 240, at 1090. 
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and well-defined narrative architecture or structure in stories.”252  
Professor Meyer suggests that the DNA of a story largely consists of five 
interrelated components.253  In the best stories, these five components fit 
together seamlessly.254  These components are: (1) Scene, (2) Cast and 
Character, (3) Plot, (4) Time Frame, and (5) Human Plight.255 
To that end, it may be difficult to tell that the true-facts cross-
examination is telling any story at all.  The questions may be asked in 
such a way as to intimate the story of Quinton Cassidy being framed, but 
the story is to some extent buried beneath all of the truthful answers.  
This is especially clear when compared to the false-story cross-
examination.256  The false-story cross-examination is principally 
designed to tell the story of how the defendant was framed through the 
questions defense counsel asks.  The fact finder can easily discern the 
alternative story and identify the five interrelated components of the 
story from the questions alone.  In fact, this is so much so that Officer 
Drebin’s answers are basically irrelevant.   
The role of narrative is also important with respect to the types of 
closing arguments that are used to raise doubts about a witness’s 
testimony.  While the false-implication closing argument may be used to 
tell a story, because the defense is constrained by making only 
technically true statements, the story is more difficult to detect.  After 
all, it is only implied, not stated.  Further, having to tell a story 
frequently qualified by the language “the evidence reflects that” or “the 
evidence demonstrates that” also hampers the trial attorney’s ability to 
seamlessly integrate the five component pieces of a story together.   
However, with respect to the false-story techniques, because the 
defense attorney is willing to make statements he knows are not true, he 
can tell the story of how the defendant was framed by easily fitting the 
five components of effective storytelling together.  He does this by 
 
252.  PHILIP N. MEYER, STORYTELLING FOR LAWYERS 3 (2014). 
253.  Id. at 4. 
254.  Id. 
255.  Id. 
256.  It is worth pointing out that it is not necessary to use the false-story cross-
examination to advance a false story, although as pointed out in this section, this false-story 
cross-examination is frequently used.  However, a false story can be told by using the answers 
elicited on the true-facts cross-examination and then using the false-story closing argument.  
Some litigators may in fact prefer such a method.  However, for the reasons previously 
detailed in Part III of this Article, this would mean that half of their conduct was ethical and 
half was not.   
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telling the story in a way that most listeners would immediately grasp as 
a story of the defendant’s innocence.   
Additionally, because the false-story closing argument is not bound 
by technically true statements, the trial attorney can tell the story using 
not only stronger language but language that represents a more 
authentic way of describing real human events.  For example, the lawyer 
can say, “Now let me tell you what really went down out there.  Officer 
Drebin can’t be believed when he says he saw my client with a gun.  In 
those dark lighting conditions, he couldn’t see anything.”  If defense 
counsel uses the false-implication closing argument, he can express the 
same point, but in a less natural way.  The lawyer must say something 
like, “The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that my 
client possessed a firearm.  To do so, you must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the police officer saw the firearm on a dark street, with poor 
lighting conditions.”  Moreover, in terms of the evidence-reflects type of 
closing argument, it is not natural to tell stories by frequently qualifying 
statements using legal sounding phrases such as “the evidence reflects,” 
or the “the evidence demonstrates that.”   
In light of the above observations, it is not surprising that the false-
story cross-examination and closing argument techniques are commonly 
used to discredit the truthful witness.257  When criminal defense 
attorneys choose trial theories, when possible, they choose to tell 
stories.258  Therefore, it is also not surprising that when defense counsel 
attempts to cast doubt on a witness’s testimony by presenting an 
alternative story to the one offered by the prosecution (and the trial has 
essentially been reduced to a story battle), defense counsel frequently 
chooses the best storytelling techniques available.259   
2. The Importance of Explicitly Stating That Your Client Is Innocent  
Another important difference between the ethical forms of closing 
arguments and the unethical false-story closing argument technique 
relates to how the client’s innocence is presented to the fact finder.  
Because the false-story technique disregards the ethical requirement of 
making technically true statements, this technique allows the trial 
attorney to tell the jury his client is innocent.260  This is a necessary 
 
257.  See supra pp. 332–35. 
258.  See MEYER, supra note 252, at 2. 
259.  See id. at 3.  
260.  See Braccialarghe, supra note 57. 
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component of the false story as the defendant’s innocence is deeply 
woven into the fabric of the alternative explanation offered to the fact 
finder.   
However, with respect to the ethical false-implication closing 
argument, the client’s innocence is only implied and, because defense 
counsel will not say something they know to be explicitly untrue, the 
jury is told that the state cannot prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt and, therefore, the defendant is “not guilty.”261   
Legal commentators have long suggested that, from the perspective 
of sound trial advocacy, it is folly for the criminal defense attorney to 
tell the jury his client is not guilty as opposed to actually innocent.262  In 
1966, Professor Monroe H. Freedman observed, 
Criminal defense lawyers do not win their cases by arguing 
reasonable doubt.  Effective trial advocacy requires that the 
attorney’s every word, action and attitude be consistent with the 
conclusion that his client is innocent.  As every trial lawyer 
knows, the jury is certain that the defense attorney knows 
whether his client is guilty.  The jury is therefore alert to, and will 
be enormously affected by, any indication by the attorney that he 
believes the defendant is guilty.  Thus, the plea of not guilty 
commits the advocate to a trial, including a closing argument, in 
which he must argue that “not guilty” means “not guilty in fact.263 
More recently, Ann Roan, articulated the difference between what 
she calls “negative case analysis” and “building the positive case for 
innocence.”264  Roan argues that a defense theory that is premised on 
what the state cannot prove represents negative case analysis.265  
However, she suggests defense theories in criminal cases should never 
be framed in this way.266  Instead, she argues that every client should be 
presented as innocent.267   
 
261.  See supra note 87 (noting the factual difference between a plea of not guilty and 
the defendant being actually innocent of the crime with which he is charged); see also 
Welkener, supra note 151, at 1088 (noting that stating a client is innocent when the defense 
counsel knows otherwise violates Model Rule 3.3(a)(1)). 
262.  E.g., Freedman, supra note 2, at 1471–72. 
263.  Id. 
264.  Ann M. Roan, Building the Persuasive Case for Innocence, CHAMPION, Mar. 2011, 
at 18, 19. 
265.  Id. 
266.  Id. 
267.  Id.  As a result, she argues that every case can be fit into one of six categories of 
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Roan suggests that juries perceive negative case analysis as a 
combination of lawyer tricks and legal technicalities.268  In Roan’s view, 
[w]hen a defense lawyer says, “The state cannot prove each and 
every element beyond a reasonable doubt,” juries hear, “Ladies 
and gentlemen, my client is guilty.  Guilty, guilty, guilty.  But 
you’re going to let him go anyway.  Why?  Because of technical 
legal mumbo-jumbo.  That’s why.”  No wonder lawyers lose 
cases when they prepare them using a negative case analysis.269 
It is true that the evidence-reflects type of closing argument allows 
defense counsel to say, “The evidence reflects my client is innocent,” as 
opposed to saying only that “My client is not guilty.”  However, even 
using this type of closing argument, defense counsel is not actually 
telling the jury his client is innocent.  Instead, every time the jury hears 
his client is innocent that statement is accompanied by a qualifying 
phrase such as “the evidence reflects that my client is innocent.”  In this 
regard, the observations of one trial attorney regarding effective closing 
argument are worth noting: “The language in closing arguments is 
entirely different from the ambiguity normally used by lawyers.  The 
lawyer can no longer afford to speak in alternatives or uncertainties.  In 
the closing argument, he must speak in absolutes.  There must be no 
doubting his position.”270 
Ultimately, the observations of the above commentators plainly 
capture the reasons why criminal defense attorneys choose to discredit 
honest witnesses through the false-story closing argument technique.  
Put simply, trial lawyers use the false-story technique because they can 
tell the jury an actual story in which the client is innocent and the story 
of their client’s innocence can be told most persuasively.271   
 
innocence.  These six categories are: (1) “It never happened (full denial)”; (2) “It happened, I 
didn’t do it (e.g., mistaken identity)”; (3) “It happened, I did it, but it was not a crime (e.g., 
self-defense)”; (4) “It happened, I did it, it was a crime, but it was not this crime (lesser 
offense)”; (5) “It happened, I did it, it was this crime, but I’m not responsible (e.g., 
entrapment; duress; choice of evils; insanity)”; and (6) “It happened, I did it, it was this crime, 
and I’m responsible—so what?”  Id.  Interestingly, Roan’s article never addresses any of the 
potential ethical implications of stating a defendant is innocent when defense counsel knows 
this to be untrue. 
268.  Id. 
269.  Id. 
270.  James H. Roberts, Jr., The SEC of Closing Arguments, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
203, 209 (1999). 
271.  It is worth noting that in the specific context of stating that the client is innocent, 
the above argument essentially boils down to the concern that use of different rhetoric, 
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3. The Culture of Criminal Defense Work  
A legal scholar once noted, “One of the most difficult tasks of a 
criminal defense attorney . . . is to determine ‘how far he may go’ in 
addressing the court.”272  Admittedly, in the heat of battle, even for the 
most ethically conscious trial attorneys, it may be difficult to avoid 
crossing the fine line between zealous advocacy and personal 
endorsement of facts known to be untrue.273  Because of the slight 
differences in the techniques used to discredit the honest witness, 
invariably even the most well-meaning attorney may inadvertently cross 
over into in the unethical phrasing of questions or argument.   
However, it is doubtful that once a criminal defense attorney has 
decided to argue a false defense and discredit a truthful witness, he will 
think much about the strictures of the numerous ethical provisions cited 
in this Article when preparing cross-examination and closing 
argument.274  Instead, when possible, he will choose to tell a false story 
and not think much about it.275  The overarching reason for this is that 
many criminal defense attorneys feel a special responsibility for their 
client’s fate.276  It is not uncommon for the inspired criminal defense 
attorney to feel as though he is “the final, and perhaps only, bulwark 
between the client and the rest of the world.”277   
In this regard, it is essential to note that the rules promulgated in 
ethics codes generally fail to take into account the social contexts in 
which professional decisions are made.278  In fact, some legal ethicists 
 
depending upon whether the defendant confesses his guilt to his lawyer, poses the practical 
problem of potentially signaling to the fact finder during closing argument that the defendant 
is guilty.  The ethical justification for prohibiting explicitly untrue statements referencing the 
client’s innocence, despite the potential for linguistic signaling, was addressed in supra Part 
III.C.2. 
272.  Harvey A. Schneider & Stephen D. Marks, The Contrasting Ethical Duties of the 
Prosecutor and Defense Attorney in Criminal Cases, 7 U.W.L.A. L. REV. 120, 131 (1975). 
273.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 167 cmt. b 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 8 1997) (“It may be difficult in practice to maintain the 
line between permissible zealous argument about facts and inferences to be drawn from them 
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274.  See Fritz Scheller, Cutting Bait, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 673, 673 (2010). 
275.  See id. 
276.  The famous criminal defense attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, once said, “I 
protect my clients against criminal guilt; judgment I leave to the power of almighty God.”  
BRIAN C. DRUMMOND, THE IMPORTANCE OF PREPARATION IN DEVELOPING A CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE STRATEGY 89 (Aspatore 2010). 
277.  Scheller, supra note 274, at 673. 
278.  Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to Be a Human Being and a 
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posit that the root cause of professional misbehavior does not result 
from lawyers being unaware of the applicable disciplinary rules or 
because these rules are too difficult to understand,279 but rather because 
of “rampant excesses of the ‘lawyering skills’ that every law student 
manages to acquire—namely rationalization and denial—that leave 
them either unable to discern their true ethical situation or unable to 
conform their conduct to known standards of professional behavior.”280   
With respect to the unethical means of casting doubt on the 
testimony of honest witnesses by telling a false story, this rationalization 
includes believing that whatever type of cross-examination or closing 
argument is used, the theory of defense is still the same.  It is not as if 
the choice of techniques has the effect of casting the witness in the light 
of either a saint or a sinner.  In other words, the criminal defense 
attorney has already passed his own personal Rubicon in which he has 
no qualms about making the honest witness appear unsure of his 
testimony or even made to look like a liar.  Yet, exactly how defense 
counsel chooses to discredit the truthful witness can impact the outcome 
of the case.   
Further, these rationalizations relate to the subtle differences 
between the ethical and unethical techniques that can be used to make 
the honest witness appear incredible.  Admittedly, whether these 
techniques are ethical or unethical turns on the subtle phrasing of 
questions and carefully worded statements asking the jury to find 
reasonable doubt.  In light of the heavy responsibility criminal defense 
attorneys feel, many have no difficulty justifying what they view as a 
minor indiscretion in light of the fact that their client may be facing 
significant consequences.281   
Some defense attorneys may embrace the false-story techniques by 
rationalizing that this particular indiscretion is extremely minor in light 
of their view that prosecutors frequently engage in far worse unethical 
behavior that is entirely inconsistent with achieving a just result.282  
 
Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 
105 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 505 (2003) (“Codes of ethics have typically ignored the social context 
in which professional decisions are made.”). 
279.  Schuwerk, supra note 6, at 795. 
280.  Id.  The same author posits that other reasons for unethical behavior relate to 
other “individual pathologies” such as mental or emotional illness or substance abuse.  Id. 
281.  See DRUMMOND, supra note 276, at 89. 
282.  For a complete discussion of one defense attorney’s view of the numerous unfair 
and potentially unethical practices that prosecutors continually engage in, see Abbe Smith, 
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Many defense attorneys may feel that the culture of the prosecutor’s 
office has now come to reflect a “win-at-all-costs” mentality.283  
Professor Abbe Smith provides the most compelling emotional example 
of this point of view when observing, “There is a courthouse saying—
known by anyone who has ever practiced criminal law—that expresses 
the ethos of winning over everything else in a grisly, sardonic way: ‘Any 
prosecutor can convict the guilty. It takes real talent to convict the 
innocent.’”284  The criminal defense attorney might reason, “So what if 
the truthful witness is made to look untruthful.  If the prosecution is 
willing to convict an innocent person, then what’s the big deal if I 
discredit a truthful witness by telling a false story as opposed to implying 
one, or if I forget to state that ‘the evidence demonstrates’ before every 
inference I ask the jury to draw.”   
Moreover, some criminal defense attorneys might embrace the most 
effective, but unethical, way of arguing a false defense for no other 
reason than they too just want to win.  Indeed, the win-at-all-costs 
mentality is alive and well in the contemporary practice of law, and not 
only at the prosecutor’s office.285  Criminal defense attorneys are 
certainly not immune from this temptation.  In her famous article 
describing the different motivations that drive individuals to become 
criminal defense attorneys, Professor Barbara Allen Babcock observed 
that for some, ego is what drives their choice of profession.286  Referring 
to these types of attorneys as the “egotist,” Professor Babcock notes, 
“And winning, ah winning has great significance because the cards are 
 
Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355 (2001). 
283.  Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must Place 
Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 16 (2009) (“The pressure to 
bring and win cases has infiltrated the very culture of the prosecutor’s office.  Prosecutors 
may have once believed their role to be like that of a judge—to evaluate and determine when 
it is fair to bring criminal charges or pursue a conviction.  Now the primary purpose of the 
prosecutor is to seek as many convictions as possible.  In turn, the pressure to produce wins 
has led to a ‘win-at-all-costs’ mentality, which pushes prosecutors toward misconduct as a 
means to an end.”). 
284.  Smith, supra note 282, at 389. 
285.  See RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE 
AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED 20–22 (1st ed. 1999) (positing 
broadly that the contemporary practice of law has redefined what “truth and justice” mean in 
representing clients).  No longer does zealous representation entail a broad understanding of 
what these words mean.  Id.  Instead, zealous advocacy has been turned into an “Adversary 
Theorem,” which defines “Truth” and “Justice” as “win at any cost.”  Id. 
286.  Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 178 
(1983–1984). 
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stacked for the prosecutor.  To win as an underdog, and to win when the 
victory is clear—there is no appeal from a ‘Not Guilty’ verdict—is 
sweet.”287   
4. The Lack of Consequences  
As this Article has shown, criminal defense attorneys choose to 
discredit the honest witness through the unethical use of the false-story 
techniques because telling a good story, using persuasive language, and 
stating their client is actually innocence makes for the most effective 
type of trial advocacy.288  Furthermore, the culture and pressures of 
being a criminal defense attorney provide additional temptation to 
eschew the selection of ethical trial techniques in the context of 
discrediting the truthful witness.289   
What undoubtedly enhances this temptation is the fact that, from a 
practical standpoint, current ethics rules are completely unable to 
prevent criminal defense attorneys from selecting these unethical 
techniques.290  There are three reasons for this: (1) attorney-client 
confidentiality/privilege and the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in criminal cases,291 (2) the rules of trial practice,292 and (3) 
the fact that defense attorney conduct at the trial level remains largely 
unchecked because of the impossibility of the government’s appealing 
the defendant’s acquittal.293   
Ethical rules and standards are intended to be self-policing.294  If an 
ethics rule prohibits an attorney from engaging in a certain type of 
conduct, the attorney should voluntarily refrain from doing so.295  
Whether the attorney would “get caught” or not is beside the point.  If 
 
287.  Id. at 178. 
288.  See supra Part IV.A.1–2. 
289.  See Scheller, supra note 274, at 674. 
290.  See infra Part IV.B. 
291.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (noting 
that with some exceptions not applicable to the current issue, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
292.  See MAUET, supra note 235, at 255–58. 
293.  See Rosemary Nidiry, Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1315 (1996). 
294.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) 
(“Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon 
understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public 
opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings.”). 
295.  Id. 
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an attorney is unwilling to police himself at trial, the only way that 
particular type of conduct can be curtailed is through an objection by 
opposing counsel, either during cross-examination or closing 
argument.296   
If an attorney chooses the false-story type of cross-examination and 
is therefore unwilling to voluntarily refrain from asking questions 
without a good faith basis, the prosecutor can object to the nature of the 
questioning.297  However, prosecutors (like all attorneys) are ethically 
prohibited from making objections without their own good faith belief 
that the objection is legally valid.298  While there are certainly factual 
scenarios in which a prosecutor might object to defense counsel’s 
questions on cross-examination by asserting a lack of good faith basis, in 
most situations, the prosecutor, ironically, has no good faith basis for 
making such an objection.299  This is because confidential statements 
made by a client during the attorney-client interview clearly satisfy the 
good faith basis test,300 and the prosecutor has no idea what the client 
told his attorney due to the protections afforded by attorney-client 
confidentiality and its accompany evidentiary privilege.301  This is also 
true because of the criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.302  Therefore, and with the ultimate twist of irony, it is 
unethical for the prosecution to object to defense counsel’s lack of a 
good faith basis on cross-examination when the prosecution has no good 
faith basis to make such an objection.   
Further, even if the prosecutor made such objections, defense 
counsel could properly claim that the nature of these objections actively 
 
296.  See Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1308. 
297.  See supra note 109 (explaining that this objection can be lodged as both an ethical 
violation and a standalone rule of evidence). 
298.  See Blinka, supra note 108, at 34; see also Tanford, supra note 111, at 521–27 
(discussing the good faith basis principle). 
299.  See Tanford, supra note 111, at 501. 
300.  Id. 
301.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (noting 
that, with some exceptions not applicable to the current issue, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client”); see also Inbal Hasbani, When the Law 
Preserves Injustice: Issues Raised by a Wrongful Incarceration Exception to Attorney-Client 
Confidentiality, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277, 282 (2010) (“Client confidentiality has 
both evidentiary and ethical components.  The attorney-client privilege, which is the 
evidentiary doctrine, is the oldest common law privilege of the various confidential 
communications.”).  The evidentiary component of attorney-client privilege is found in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 
302.  See supra note 52. 
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sought to intrude on the attorney-client privilege.303  Indeed, the 
attorney-client privilege shields a client’s confidential statements to an 
attorney that relate to the client’s past criminal misconduct.304  While an 
assertion of the privilege typically allows a court to require disclosure of 
the privileged communication in order to rule on the validity of the 
privilege claim, an exception to this rule exists when the privileged 
communication between attorney and client implicates the defendant’s 
past criminal wrongdoing.305  Therefore, because of the protections 
afforded by attorney-client privilege, prosecutors are unable to force 
defense counsel to reveal the good faith basis for the questions asked on 
cross-examination through the use of an evidentiary objection.  As a 
result, prosecutors are unable to discover if defense counsel has a good 
faith basis for the cross-examination in the first place.   
Not surprisingly, when prosecutors do object, asserting the lack of a 
good faith basis, to defense counsel’s questions on cross-examination, 
research has failed to reveal any case in which the prosecutor alleged 
that defense counsel knew a question’s implication was false because he 
was told such by his client.306  Rather, when the prosecution objects, 
citing defense counsel’s lack of a good faith basis, these objections 
usually arise because the questions themselves do not appear to have 
much possibility of being supported by what the defendant might have 
told his defense attorney in confidence.307  In other words, the 
 
303.  See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989). 
304.  Id. (noting that attorney-client privilege allows clients to “‘make full disclosure to 
their attorneys’ of past wrongdoings” (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)). 
305.  See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.12 (5th 
ed. 2012) (“When privilege claims are made, and the purpose of the hearing is to determine 
the validity of these claims, the court may require disclosure of the material in order to rule 
except when the claim asserts the privilege against self-incrimination.”).  It should be noted 
that the court may require disclosure of the communication that is subject to the privilege 
claim when the party seeking the communication is claiming the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege.  Id. § 5.22.  The crime fraud exception requires an allegation that the 
client sought the services of the attorney with respect to ongoing or future crimes or frauds.  
Id. § 5.22.  And even when asserting the crime fraud exception to attorney-client privilege, 
before a court can require disclosure of requested communications, it is necessary for the 
requesting party to make a showing supporting a good faith belief that the crime-fraud 
exception applies.  Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572. 
306.  See supra note 109.  This research includes an extensive search of annotated ethics 
codes, attorney disciplinary hearings, formal ethics opinions, court opinions and numerous 
secondary sources including scholarly articles and bar publications. 
307.  For an example of a scenario in which a prosecutor might object to defense 
counsel’s questions because they do not have a good faith basis, see United States v. Taylor, 
522 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2008).  In Taylor, crack cocaine was seized in a car following a traffic 
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prosecution had a good faith basis for believing the defense attorney’s 
questions were not supported by a good faith basis.  When the theory of 
defense could reasonably be supported by something told to the 
attorney by his client, prosecutors seem to allow defense attorneys 
almost free rein on cross-examination.308   
In terms of the false-story closing argument, the rules of trial 
practice regulate attorney conduct during closing argument.309  The rules 
of trial practice are largely enforced through adversarial objections 
made before the trial judge.310  What an attorney may or may not say 
during closing argument is grounded in the constitutional right to a fair 
 
stop.  Id. at 733.  At trial, the passenger in the defendant’s car testified for the government 
and told the jury that the defendant indicated he was planning to sell drugs during their trip.  
Id. at 735.  The defense attorney attempted to cross-examine the passenger concerning 
whether the government had quashed state warrants before trial in exchange for her 
cooperation.  Id. at 736.  Defense counsel had learned that the passenger had outstanding 
state warrants that had been quashed and suspected that a deal had been made for the 
passenger’s testimony.  Id.  The trial court held a hearing on the issue and the passenger 
testified that she did not know why the warrants had been quashed.  Id.  An investigator also 
explained that no promises had been made to quash the warrants.  Id.  The prosecutor 
informed the judge that there was no federal government role in quashing the warrants.  Id.  
Perhaps the most interesting case in which a defense attorney had to answer for bad faith 
cross-examination can be found in the 1945 case of United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d 
Cir. 1945).  In Pugliese, defense counsel attempted numerous times to question a witness 
regarding her hospitalization for a mental illness.  Id. at 498 & n.1.  The court actually allowed 
the prosecutor to then question defense counsel about the evidentiary basis for this line of 
questioning.  Id. at 498–99.  However, the court’s reasoning was premised on the notion that 
the prosecution “might probe for any that existed, for, if there was any, certainly it was not 
privileged.”  Id. at 499. 
308.  See, e.g., Pugliese, 153 F.2d at 498–99. 
309.  The rules of trial practice are closely related to evidentiary rules, but are 
conceptually distinct.  See Dale Alan Bruschi, Evidence: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 
NOVA L. REV. 255, 323–24 (1992).  While evidentiary rules regulate the admission of 
evidence into the trial record itself, the rules of evidence do not technically address an 
attorney’s conduct during opening or closing statements.  Id.  Instead, attorney conduct 
during opening and closing statements is governed by the rules of trial practice.  See id.  The 
rules of evidence do not apply to opening and closings statements because at these stages in 
the proceedings the trial court is not receiving evidence.  Id.  Rather, on opening, the 
attorneys are only addressing what evidence they believe will be presented during the trial 
and at closing the attorneys are only asking the jury to draw inferences based on the evidence 
that has, or has not, already been entered.  Id.  As a result, the majority of objections made 
during an opening statement or closing argument are not related to a specific evidentiary rule 
or code provision.  Id.  Instead, what an attorney may or may not say on opening and closing 
is regulated by the rules of trial practice, which are grounded in the constitutional right to a 
fair trial.  See id. 
310.  Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1308. 
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trial, which is largely defined in appellate decisions and enforced by the 
trial court.311   
As it relates to permissible closing arguments, courts have generally 
mandated that defense counsel provide a basic evidentiary foundation 
for the inferences he is arguing.312  Arguing without this evidentiary 
foundation is considered objectionable.313  However, as explained above, 
with respect to the ethical limits of the false-story closing argument, 
while the defense attorney knows it to be false, the false story is 
nevertheless supported by an evidentiary foundation.314  Frankly, it is 
the existence of this foundation that makes the overall theory of defense 
compelling in the first place.  In this sense, the rules of trial advocacy 
provide very little basis upon which opposing counsel can ferret out this 
type of ethically inappropriate conduct.315   
Further, because of the protections afforded by the doctrine of 
attorney-client confidentiality and the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination, there appear to be no instances in which defense 
attorneys have been brought before disciplinary committees when they 
have asked questions on cross-examination or have inappropriately 
argued false inferences from true facts when it was revealed that the 
defense counsel had knowledge of the defendant’s guilt.316  Only the 
defendant and his attorney know that questions may have been asked 
without a good faith basis and that an argument may have been 
presented to the jury by altering certain words and phrases in an 
inappropriate way.  And neither of them are talking.   
While both defense attorneys and prosecutors are held to the same 
ethical standards,317 a defense attorney is unlikely to ever have his 
 
311.  See Bruschi, supra note 309, at 323–24; see also J. Alexander Tanford, Closing 
Argument Procedure, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 47, 108–09 (1986) (“A party who loses at trial 
and believes that infractions of closing argument rules contributed to that loss, may appeal.  
Theoretically, a party appeals because the trial judge failed to properly enforce the rules of 
argument, not because the other attorney broke the rules.  The appellate courts are supposed 
to decide whether the trial judge ruled correctly on objections and responded appropriately to 
errors.” (footnote omitted)). 
312.  Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1315. 
313.  Id. 
314.  See supra Part III.A.3.c. 
315.  See supra notes 309–311 and accompanying text. 
316.  Once again, this research includes an extensive search of annotated ethics codes, 
attorney disciplinary hearings, formal ethics opinions, court opinions and numerous 
secondary sources including scholarly articles and bar publications. 
317.  United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). 
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unethical behavior on cross-examination or closing argument reviewed 
by a higher court.318  Due to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, the prosecution does not have the availability of appealing 
a not guilty verdict. 319  As a result, there is almost no case law discussing 
defense attorney misconduct.320   
B. The Limits of Reforming Ethical Rules to Prevent Unethical Behavior 
Not only are existing ethical rules unable to prevent the use of the 
false-story techniques but little can be done in the way of reforming the 
rules themselves so that they can more effectively regulate the unethical 
means by which honest witnesses are made to look untruthful.   
For the reasons extensively detailed in Part III of this Article, there 
is little doubt that current ethics rules and standards do prohibit the 
unethical false-story techniques.  As a result, little could be gained by 
amending existing ethics rules to regulate behavior that the rules already 
clearly regulate.  To that end, it is worth noting once again the 
observation of legal ethicists who believe that the root cause of 
“professional misbehavior” does not result from lawyers being unaware 
of the applicable disciplinary rules or because these rules are too 
difficult to understand.321  Instead, lawyers choose to ignore ethical rules 
by rationalizing away their dictates to such an extent that some lawyers 
are simply “unable to conform their conduct to known standards of 
professional behavior.”322   
If the ethical rules as currently constructed rely so heavily on self-
policing and attorneys are unwilling to do so, why not simply change the 
law in a way that would allow the competing parties to more effectively 
police each other and discover unethical conduct?  Undoubtedly, 
insurmountable hurdles exist in this regard.  It appears highly unlikely 
that there would be much support in almost any segment of the legal 
community for eliminating the protections afforded by attorney-client 
 
318.  See id. at 9 n.6. 
319.  “Of course, when defense counsel employs tactics which would be reversible error 
if used by a prosecutor, the result may be an unreviewable acquittal.”  Id.  The Fifth 
Amendment reads in relevant part, “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
320.  See Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1315 (“Unlike prosecutorial misconduct, defense 
attorney excess in closing arguments are rarely documented.  Because of the absence of 
appellate review of improper acquittals, case law almost never discusses defense misconduct.  
It is thus much more difficult to find examples of such improprieties.” (footnote omitted)). 
321.  Schuwerk, supra note 6, at 795. 
322.  Id. 
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privilege, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the 
defendant’s Double Jeopardy protections, or for allowing attorneys to 
make evidentiary objections without a good faith legal basis.   
Society has long ago decided that, similar to the guilty defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination and closing argument, the 
values advanced by the attorney-client privilege, the right against self-
incrimination, double jeopardy protections, and the rules of evidence 
outweigh the fact that in any given instance they allow the truth to be 
obscured and the guilty to go free.323  As a result, because of the 
importance of these rules of law, it is extremely unlikely that these rules 
will be changed so that the defendant’s guilt can be revealed and, 
correspondingly, whether defense counsel has employed unethical 
tactics in the course of advancing a false defense may be discovered as 
well.   
After all, if society is willing to accept that those who have engaged 
in criminal wrongdoing, even to the point of committing the most 
morally reprehensible crimes, may go free in order to protect the 
innocent, it would seem society is also willing to accept that criminal 
defense attorneys may not be disciplined for subtly altering rhetoric in 
such a way as to advance a false a defense through the use of words and 
phrases that may cross an ethical line.   
In terms of attorney-client privilege, a client’s ability to 
communicate confidentially with his attorney, and the related 
evidentiary privilege protecting that right, have long been deemed a 
“bedrock principle” of our justice system,324 being formally recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court over a century ago.325  The value of 
attorney-client confidentiality stems from the fact that competent 
representation requires that a lawyer be “fully informed of all the facts 
of the matter he is handling.”326  “[Because] clients are not likely to give 
full, candid, and possibly incriminating or embarrassing facts to their 
lawyers unless they are confident that the lawyer will keep the 
 
323.  See Mitchell, supra note 17, at 341. 
324.  Andrew S. Bolin, A Troubling Invasion into the Attorney-Client Privilege: Shands 
Teaching Hospital and Clinics v. Dannemann Asks the United States Supreme Court to 
Consider a Physician’s Right to Counsel in Florida, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2011, at 7, 8 
(“The protection of communications between client and lawyer, as embodied in the attorney-
client privilege, is a bedrock principle of our justice system.”). 
325.  See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). 
326.  Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981) (quoting MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1979)). 
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information confidential,” attorney-client confidentiality has been 
deemed an essential means of ensuring the effective assistance of 
counsel.327   
However, a tension exists between the values advanced by attorney-
client confidentiality and a search for the truth.328  Nevertheless, courts 
have acknowledged that this “is the price that society must pay for the 
availability of justice to every citizen, which is the value that the 
privilege is designed to secure.”329  The “social good derived from the 
proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their 
clients . . . outweigh[s] the harm that may come from the suppression of 
the evidence.”330 
As a result, it appears a virtual certainty that the over-century-old 
guarantee of confidentiality afforded to attorney-client communications 
will not be disturbed in order to determine if the client has confessed to 
his attorney and the attorney is therefore knowingly making untrue 
statements during closing argument or asking questions without a good 
faith basis.  Society has determined that the good advanced by 
protecting attorney-client confidentiality is outweighed by the fact that 
such confidentiality may operate to hide the truth from being 
discovered.331   
It is also a virtual certainty that there will not be a constitutional 
amendment eliminating the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.  The right against self-incrimination can be traced back as 
far as the twelfth century, and by the seventeenth century, the privilege 
against self-incrimination was firmly established in England and the 
American colonies.332  The primary purpose of the privilege against self-
 
327.  Hasbani, supra note 301, at 283–84 (citing In re A John Doe Grand Jury 
Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990)).  
328.  Id. at 284 (“Despite the benefits of confidentiality, it can produce some friction 
with the search for truth.”).  
329.  In re A John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d at 70. 
330.  Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1028–29 (Mass. 1985)).  
331.  There are exceptions to this rule.  The most obvious exception is the presentation 
of false evidence or allowing the client to commit perjury.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3), (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).  The crime fraud exception discussed at 
greater length in supra note 305 is also an exception.  A far less common exception to 
attorney-client confidentiality has been adopted in twenty-six states and allows attorneys to 
divulge confidential communications that would prevent wrongful incarceration or execution.  
See Colin Miller, Ordeal by Innocence: Why There Should Be a Wrongful 
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 391, 393 (2008).  
332.  Mary A. Shein, Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Siege: 
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incrimination is to “avoid confronting the witness with the ‘cruel 
trilemma’ of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.”333  Further, “the 
privilege plays an important role in preserving the accusatorial nature of 
the American criminal justice system.”334  Preserving the right against 
self-incrimination ensures that the state bears the burden of establishing 
guilt and helps maintain a fair balance between the power of the state 
and the autonomy of the individual.335  The right against self-
incrimination is equally applicable to both the guilty and innocent 
alike.336  Courts have noted, “[It is] better for an occasional crime to go 
unpunished than that the prosecution should be free to build up a 
criminal case, in whole or in part, with the assistance of enforced 
disclosures by the accused.”337   
Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that a right that has been deemed 
fundamental since colonial times338 will be changed in such a way as to 
allow the government to force the defendant to reveal his guilt, admit 
the government’s witness is telling the truth, and consequently expose 
the existence of a knowingly false defense.   
Further, like the right against self-incrimination, the origins of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution predate the 
Constitution itself and can trace its modern origins to seventeenth 
century English common law.339  The principle justification for the 
 
Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 503, 507 (1993). 
333.  Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona), 732 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). 
334.  Shein, supra note 332, at 510. 
335.  Id. (“Accusatorial procedures ensure that the state bears the burden of establishing 
guilt and help maintain a ‘fair-state-individual balance.’”). 
336.  See Craig Peyton Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth or Consequences: The 
Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 498 n.4 (1997) (“Unlike the Fourth 
Amendment, which serves to protect both the guilty and the innocent from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination primarily 
serves to protect the guilty.” (citing Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Endres (In re Endres), 103 
B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
337.  United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1215 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting Maffie v. 
United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954)).  
338.  Shein, supra note 332, at 507 (“Throughout the colonies the general principle that 
individuals should not be compelled to give evidence against themselves emerged as a 
fundamental right.”). 
339.  See William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 
411, 414 (1993) (“While the origin of double jeopardy protection might be found in early 
Roman or canon law, and it may have appeared in embryonic form in England in the 
fourteenth century, by the seventeenth century the basic modern rule against double jeopardy 
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Double Jeopardy Clause is that “the State with all its resources and 
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.”340  While the focus of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause appears to be principally concerned with 
protecting the innocent, it nevertheless also serves to protect the guilty 
from successive trials and punishment.341   
It is highly doubtful that a constitutional provision of such 
magnitude, applying with equal force to the guilty as well as to the 
innocent, would be so easily cast aside to allow the prosecution the right 
to appeal a verdict of not guilty.342  And without this right to appeal, the 
prosecution has little ability to have an appellate court review the 
conduct of defense counsel.343  Even in the extremely unlikely event that 
the prosecution was ever able to appeal an acquittal, there would be 
little for the prosecution to protest in terms of how defense counsel 
sought to discredit the truthful witness on cross-examination and closing 
argument.344  For the reasons previously discussed relating to attorney-
client privilege and the right against self-incrimination, the prosecution 
would simply have no idea whether defense counsel employed unethical 
forms of cross-examination or closing argument in the first place.345   
Lastly, it is unlikely that courts would be willing to embrace evidence 
or ethics rules that allow for unrestrained objections in the absence of a 
good faith belief that the objection was legally proper.  The reason for 
this is primarily a pragmatic one: the rules of evidence are in part 
designed to control the scope and duration of trials, even if that means 
 
was well established and encompassed within the common-law pleas of autrefois acquit, 
autrefois convict, autrefois attaint (literally, other times acquitted, convicted, or attainted—i.e., 
had one’s goods declared forfeited), and former pardon.” (footnotes omitted)). 
340.  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
341.  Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1815 
(1997) (“Here we see how the Double Jeopardy Clause, via the constitutionally guaranteed 
plea of autrefois convict, protects even the guilty.  But the Clause is more precious for its 
protection of the innocent, via the constitutionally grounded plea of autrefois acquit.”). 
342.  See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Ball, 163 
U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (verdict of acquittal at the hands of the jury is not subject to review by 
appeal). 
343.  See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text. 
344.  See Nidiry, supra note 293, at 1315. 
345.  See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text. 
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that the outcome of a trial is imperfect.346  Additionally, even if a 
prosecutor could object to a line of questioning in the absence of a good 
faith basis, attorney-client privilege and the constitutional right against 
self-incrimination would ensure that such objections would ultimately be 
unable to reveal whether defense counsel’s questions were premised on 
a good faith basis and whether defense counsel was knowingly stating 
untruths to the jury.347   
Even more to the point, if we lived in a society where none of the 
above legal protections applied, the criminal defendant might also live 
in a society where the guilty defendant had no right to any defense at all, 
let alone the right to an attorney who discredited the truthful witness 
and argued a false defense on their behalf.   
In light of the above, ethics rules that define the parameters of how 
the truthful witness can be discredited will remain very much dependent 
upon attorneys policing themselves, despite this obvious shortcoming.   
C. Culture Change as an Alternative Route 
This Article has demonstrated that there are both ethical and 
unethical types of cross-examinations and closing arguments that can be 
used to discredit the truthful witness and advance a false theory of 
defense.348  To be fair, this Article has certainly detailed the flaws 
associated with the ethical types of cross-examination and closing 
arguments that can be used to accomplish this task and how these 
techniques are likely to be less effective than their unethical, false 
storytelling counterparts.349  Nevertheless, if criminal defense attorneys 
wish to cast doubt on the testimony of an honest witness, ethical means 
are available to do so.  And while these means might not be nearly as 
effective as their unethical counterparts, they still allow the criminal 
defense attorney to advance a false defense by discrediting the truthful 
witness.350   
 
346.  See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 305, § 1.1. 
347.  See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989). 
348.  See supra Part III.A.–B. 
349.  See supra Part IV.A. 
350.  While this Article has pointed out that unethical forms of cross-examination and 
closing argument are generally more effective than their unethical counterparts, this is not to 
suggest that the ethical means of discrediting the truthful witness cannot be persuasive as 
well.  For example, as pointed out previously, some trial attorneys may prefer the true-facts 
cross-examination to the false-story cross-examination as a matter of personal style.  Supra 
note 256.  Further, it is possible for a persuasive closing argument to be crafted by arguing 
inferences that can be drawn from true facts while making only true statements.  Professors 
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However, if contemporary ethics rules cannot adequately prevent 
criminal defense attorneys from choosing unethical means to advance a 
false defense, what, if anything, can be done to convince them to 
voluntarily choose the ethical means of doing so?  Perhaps the answer 
lies in bringing about a change in the culture of criminal defense 
lawyering.   
A counter-rationalization to the ones noted above should be 
presented to those present and future practicing defense attorneys who 
will find themselves in the trenches of America’s criminal courtrooms.  
This counter-rationalization should relate to imploring criminal defense 
attorneys to recognize the normative value of ethics rules that, in 
allowing for the presentment of a false defense while ensuring that the 
attorney does not explicitly make untrue statements, represent a fair 
balance between the guilty defendant’s constitutional right to force the 
state to meet its burden of proof, zealous advocacy, and the defense 
attorney’s role as an officer of the court dedicated to the search for the 
truth.   
How to bring about a change in the culture of criminal defense 
lawyering, in which the value of these ethics rules and ultimately the 
ethical practice of law are advanced over the objective of winning, is a 
question of great importance and worthy of a detailed analysis of its 
own.  While this Article cannot fully endeavor to answer this question in 
the space provided, it is worth exploring a few potential areas of focus.   
First, it should be noted that, while attorneys may recognize that 
current ethics rules place limits on certain forms of cross-examination 
and closing arguments, more focus should be directed at emphasizing 
the reasonableness of those limits and the ideals the rules are designed 
to promote.  As a result, a change in the culture of criminal defense 
lawyering must begin in earnest with those segments of the legal 
community that not only teach lawyers about the ethical limitations of 
discrediting the truthful witnesses but also are in a position to stress that 
contemporary ethics rules represent a fair compromise between 
competing interests and values.   
 
Ohlbaum and Myers provide two such examples in crafting ethically permissible cross-
examinations closing arguments that advance false defenses in the form of misidentification 
and consent in a rape case.  See Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2, at 1060–70.  Moreover, if 
criminal defense attorneys more earnestly endeavored to craft persuasive and ethical cross-
examinations and closing arguments they would likely find ways to minimize the 
shortcomings associated with lack of narrative structure and the inability to vouch for your 
client’s innocence that are associated with ethical forms of trial advocacy.  
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In light of this observation, any future discussion relating to this 
topic should undoubtedly address the important role of our nation’s law 
schools in training future practitioners.351  Legal educators have long 
recognized the importance of law schools in training ethical lawyers.352  
It is in law school that future lawyers are first exposed to the legal 
profession and may take lessons learned regarding the ethical practice of 
law directly into their future practice.353   
However, courses designed to teach legal ethics infrequently explore 
the ideals behind the construction of current ethics rules.354  In this 
regard, a criticism of law school ethics courses is that, rather than focus 
on the values reflected in ethics rules, these courses tend to be geared 
toward teaching students how to pass the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Examination.355   
In the context of discrediting the truthful witness, the ethical practice 
of law can best be taught by addressing the advocacy techniques that are 
used in the real-world practice of law.  In doing so, not only should the 
ethical limitations of certain types of cross-examination and closing 
argument be defined but also the value of these ethical limitations from 
a normative standpoint should be stressed.356   
 
351.  Once again, this Article leaves for another day a discussion concerning how best 
teach legal ethics and how to structure the law school curriculum in this regard.  Legal 
educators have advanced numerous opinions relating to this issue and this discussion is a 
vibrant one.  How best to focus on the ethical parameters of the techniques used to discredit 
the truthful witness in the context of teaching legal ethics is a topic that I imagine would be 
subject to much debate amongst those teaching professional ethics and trial advocacy.  For an 
excellent discussion concerning the numerous approaches law schools use in teaching 
professional responsibility, see Bruce A. Green, Less Is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in 
Context, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357 (1998). 
352.  See Edward D. Re, Professionalism for the Legal Profession, 11 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 
683, 695 (2001–2002) (“Lawyers are usually first introduced to the profession as students in 
law school.  It is in law school that lawyers first learn rules of law, are introduced to the 
practice of law, and the ideals of law as a profession.”); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by 
the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 42 (1992) (“The rationale for addressing 
professional responsibility issues in some form is to increase students’ awareness, analytic 
skills, and ultimately, if indirectly, to influence their future conduct.”). 
353.  Re, supra note 352, at 695. 
354.  See Jeffrey A. Maine, Importance of Ethics and Morality in Today’s Legal World, 
29 STETSON L. REV. 1073, 1078–79 (2000). 
355.  Id. at 1078 (noting that law-school ethics courses are often geared to preparing 
students to pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination).  
356.  This is not to say that the ethical parameters of the techniques used to argue a false 
defense on cross-examination and closing argument are never addressed in law school 
courses.  For an example, Professors Edward Ohlbaum and Eleanor Myers describe a course 
in which the ethics of discrediting the truthful witness on cross-examination and closing 
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Moreover, these lessons should be incorporated into professional 
responsibility courses, as well as courses which address the issue of 
arguing a false defense in the context of trial advocacy357 as the question 
of how to ethically make the true look false and the false look true 
squarely sits at the intersection of both.358   
In addition to America’s law schools, other potential avenues of 
exploration in terms of their effect on the culture of criminal defense 
lawyering are professional bar associations359 and continuing legal 
education courses that are required for practicing lawyers,360 as well as 
focusing on those who train criminal defense attorneys specifically at 
large institutional public defenders offices.361   
It should be acknowledged that stressing the fairness of the ethical 
constraints associated with discrediting the truthful witness and arguing 
a false defense may not serve to completely counterbalance the reasons 
 
argument are taught through demonstrations of different types of trial advocacy techniques.  
See Myers & Ohlbaum, supra note 2. 
357.  For example, this may include a standalone trial advocacy class or may occur in the 
context of a law school clinic where this type of issue may emerge in the course of discussing 
trial theory or preparing for trial.  Additionally, some institutions coordinate their ethics 
course with trial advocacy and evidence courses, as was done at Northwestern University 
School of Law.  Robert P. Burns, Legal Ethics in Preparation for Law Practice, 75 NEB. L. 
REV. 684, 702–03 (1996); see also supra note 351 (noting the vibrant discussion concerning 
how best to teach legal ethics in law school). 
358.  See Green, supra note 351, at 359. 
359.  See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 193, 211–18 (1996) (noting the important role that professional bar associations 
play in terms of encouraging and enforcing ethical and professionally responsible behavior by 
members of the bar). 
360.  “During the past quarter-century, most American states have adopted continuing 
education requirements for lawyers. . . . In many states, some portion of the continuing legal 
education requirements must be devoted to legal ethics.”  Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. 
Clark’s Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 59 (2005) (footnote 
omitted). 
361.  The impact of focusing on those who most directly train criminal defense attorney’s 
at large public defenders offices may result in a cultural change with respect to what is 
considered ethically acceptable practice within that office.  Scholars have noted that the 
culture of ethical lawyering that exists in individual prosecutor’s offices can impact the 
conduct of prosecutors.  See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 351–53 (2001).  There is little reason to believe that a public defender’s 
office would be different.  Moreover, while not specific to a culture of ethical lawyering, 
numerous commentators have described the effects of the office culture on the behavior of 
those working in a particular public defenders office.  See Professor Rodney J. Uphoff & 
Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and Criminal 
Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 60 
(1998). 
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defense attorneys choose unethical trial techniques.  However, if 
defense attorneys come to see these rules as representing a balance 
between important, but often times competing, values, as opposed to 
unreasonable constraints placed on defending their clients, they will be 
far more likely to follow their dictates.   
V. CONCLUSION  
This Article has demonstrated that while there are both ethical and 
unethical forms of cross-examination and closing argument that can be 
used to discredit the truthful witness and argue a false defense, criminal 
defense attorneys frequently choose the latter.362  The reasons for this 
phenomenon range from effective trial advocacy, the culture of criminal 
defense lawyering, to the fact that it is almost impossible to get caught.363   
Moreover, not only are current ethics rules unable to prevent the use 
of these unethical techniques, it is extremely unlikely these rules will 
ever be amended in order to more effectively prevent their use.364   
As a result, the culture of criminal defense lawyering must change in 
such a way that criminal defense lawyers recognize the normative value 
of ethics rules that allow for truthful witnesses to be discredited, while 
placing reasonable constraints on the types of cross-examinations and 
closing arguments that are used to accomplish this task.   
By shedding light on how criminal defense attorneys choose to 
discredit honest witnesses through unethical means, this Article hopes 
to begin a dialogue concerning how our profession can best respond to 
this particular reality and ultimately ensure more forthright compliance 
with the ethical dictates that govern the practice of law.   
 
362.  See supra Parts III.A, III.B., IV.A. 
363.  See supra Part IV.A. 
364.  See supra Part IV.B. 
